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CRYPTOCURRENCY MEETS BANKRUPTCY 
LAW: A CALL FOR CREDITOR STATUS FOR 
INVESTORS IN INITIAL COIN OFFERINGS 
Miriam R. Albert & J. Scott Colesanti* 
ABSTRACT 
In 1973, experts Homer Kripke and John J. Slain published a 
seminal study titled The Interface Between Securities Regulation and 
Bankruptcy—Allocating the Risk of Illegal Securities Issuance 
between Securityholders and the Issuer’s Creditors. That lengthy 
analysis, contributed by, respectively, a former Securities and 
Exchange Commission official and a professor of law, examined the 
status quo and concluded that investors were receiving unfair priority 
vis-à-vis creditors in bankruptcy proceedings administered under the 
federal Bankruptcy Code. Focusing on the traditional “absolute 
priority rule,” the study pointed out that the Securities and Exchange 
Commission support for the investor priority was unfounded and 
urged deference to the notion of general creditors coming first. 
Since then, a host of developments complicated both the analysis 
and the traditional view of Kripke and Slain. First, the pivotal 
determination of “rescinding shareholder” has been made complex 
by, among other things, an expanded notion of “sophisticated 
investor” occasioned by phenomena such as “crowdfunding.” 
Second, stock swaps, hedges, repurchase agreements, and other 
hybrid responses to financier discomfort have clouded the definition 
of “investor.” Finally, the explosive growth of cryptocurrencies (and 
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the ventures that would sell, distribute, trade, or package them) 
highlighted the need for a new, softer line between creditor and 
investor. 
Accordingly, the present authors revisit the absolute priority rule 
with a view towards historic SEC involvement with bankruptcy law 
and contemporary classification of some cryptocurrency-related 
entities as securities issuers. The article concludes that in light of the 
existing provisions and interpretations, the “absolute priority rule” 
examined through the lens of today’s innovative securities should be 
rethought to give investors in initial coin offerings creditor status. 
Whether the reader agrees or not is likely subordinated to the need 
for a conversation on the most egalitarian response—under both the 
securities laws and the Bankruptcy Code—to the investor’s claim for 
in pari passu treatment normally reserved for creditors, and likewise 
the general creditors’ opposition to sharing a legally enforceable 
priority. 
INTRODUCTION 
A.   Crypto Among Us 
In March 2019, close to $200 million worth of cryptocurrency was 
lost when the owner of a cryptocurrency trading platform died in sole 
possession of its digital key.1 The debacle foisted the trading 
platform into court protection, prompting calls for national legislation 
by the Canadian Securities Administrators.2 
Indeed, such security problems are not unexpected. At year-end 
2017, the meteoric rise of the price of Bitcoin (e.g., $17,900) posed a 
regulatory challenge to courts and government agencies alike.3 
                                                                                                             
 1. Kristine Owram, Canada Moves to Regulate Crypto Trading Amid Quadriga Scandal, 
BLOOMBERG (Mar. 14, 2019, 11:00 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-03-
14/canada-moves-to-regulate-crypto-trading-amid-quadriga-scandal [https://perma.cc/VRE8-B5UF]. 
 2. Id. (noting that “[c]rypto assets with a value of almost $1 billion were stolen in 2018 from 
platforms around the world”). 
 3. Jemima Kelly, Bitcoin Hits New Record High as Warnings Grow Louder, REUTERS (Aug. 27, 
2019, 11:13 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-global-markets-bitcoin/bitcoin-hits-new-record-
high-as-warnings-grow-louder-idUSKBN1E919T [https://perma.cc/PG4L-2BN8]; see Rakesh Sharma, 
 
2
Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 36, Iss. 2 [2020], Art. 1
https://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/gsulr/vol36/iss2/1
2020] CRYPTOCURRENCY MEETS BANKRUPTCY LAW 235 
Moreover, the first and largest Bitcoin exchange, Mt. Gox, remains 
protected by Japanese bankruptcy laws.4 These regulatory challenges 
are rife with difficulties, often chief among them the battle for 
prioritized status between creditors and depositors–investors—if such 
are even identifiable as distinct classes.5 
A spinoff of the volatile, virtual investment craze arrived in recent 
years in the form of initial coin offerings (ICOs).6 In such ventures, 
fledgling companies with grandiose plans exchange future “tokens” 
                                                                                                             
Bitcoin Has a Regulation Problem, INVESTOPEDIA (Aug. 27, 2019, 11:19 AM), 
https://www.investopedia.com/news/bitcoin-has-regulation-problem/ [https://perma.cc/R57T-EHPE]. 
 4. See Tim Allman, MtGox Bitcoin Exchange Files for Bankruptcy, BBC (Mar. 1, 2014), 
https://www.bbc.com/news/av/business-26394986/mtgox-bitcoin-exchange-files-for-bankruptcy 
[https://perma.cc/5YZB-PBYX]. As of March 2019, a class action against the Mt. Gox owner and a 
third-party bank remains on the docket for the Northern District of Illinois. Fourth Amended Class 
Action Complaint at 1, Greene v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd., 206 F. Supp. 3d 1362 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (No. 1:14-
cv-01437). That action—effectively stayed by the Japanese bankruptcy action—alleges, among other 
things, conversion, consumer fraud, and negligence. Id. at 21; see infra Section III.A. for a discussion of 
the Mt. Gox debacle. 
 5. See, e.g., NATHANIEL POPPER, DIGITAL GOLD: BITCOIN AND THE INSIDE STORY OF THE 
MISFITS AND MILLIONAIRES TRYING TO REINVENT MONEY 317 (2015) (“An academic study in 
2013 had found that 45% of the Bitcoin exchanges that had taken money had gone under, several taking 
the money of their customers with them.”); David Meyer, After Bitcoin Spike, Mt. Gox Creditors Want 
to Yank the Failed Exchange Out of Bankruptcy, FORTUNE (Dec. 13, 2017), 
http://fortune.com/2017/12/13/bitcoin-mtgox-bankruptcy-creditors/ [https://perma.cc/93M3-ZGK9]. 
 6. Jake Frankenfeld, Initial Coin Offering (ICO), INVESTOPEDIA (Nov. 4, 2019), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/i/initial-coin-offering-ico.asp [https://perma.cc/A97L-ATG7]. 
Virtual currency has been defined as: 
[A] digital representation of value that can be digitally traded and functions as: (1) a 
medium of exchange; and/or (2) a unit of account; and/or (3) a store of value, but 
does not have legal tender status (i.e., when tendered to a creditor, is a valid and legal 
offer of payment) in any jurisdiction. It is not issued or guaranteed by any 
jurisdiction, and fulfil[l]s the above functions only by agreement within the 
community of users of the virtual currency. Virtual currency is distinguished from fiat 
currency (a.k.a. “real currency,” “real money,” or “national currency”), which is the 
coin and paper money of a country that is designated as its legal tender; circulates; 
and is customarily used and accepted as a medium of exchange in the issuing country. 
It is distinct from e-money, which is a digital representation of fiat currency used to 
electronically transfer value denominated in fiat currency. 
FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, VIRTUAL CURRENCIES—KEY DEFINITIONS AND POTENTIAL AML/CFT 
RISKS 4 (June 2014), http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Virtual-currency-key-
definitions-and-potential-aml-cft-risks.pdf [https://perma.cc/9B7J-U342]. For purposes of this article, 
cryptocurrency and ICOs are equated as digital assets. A newer variation, the exchange traded fund 
investing in such assets, already comes closer to regulation, as is evidenced by related filings for 
registration with the Securities and Exchange Commission. See Nikhilesh De, Bitwise Files for New 
ETF with SEC, COINDESK (Jan. 10, 2019, 3:26 PM), https://www.coindesk.com/bitwise-plans-new-
bitcoin-etf-with-nyse-arca [https://perma.cc/K9X8-GG3N]. 
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in a unique digital enterprise for investment.7 These enterprises state 
plausible cases for securities law coverage, particularly in light of the 
great many federal court holdings urging expansion of the securities 
laws in favor of investor protection.8 For example, a company 
promising partial ownership of a purely cyberspace enterprise may 
accord digital tokens on a pro rata scale tied to the level of 
investment. Such tokens only carry value in the accompanying 
“blockchain” (i.e., digital ledger created by the enterprise).9 
Compounding the regulatory challenge are the myriad definitional 
hesitancies: the United States (U.S.) Department of the Treasury has 
not declared Bitcoin or similar creations the equivalent of fiat 
currencies, instead simply insisting that cash exchanges for 
cryptocurrencies satisfy currency transaction requirements.10 The 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) formally identified Bitcoin as 
“property,” gains on which must be taxed like all other gains on 
properties.11 And via a 2015 disciplinary decision, the U.S. 
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) proclaimed 
Bitcoin a “commodity,” thus making the instrument subject to 
regulations promulgated under the Commodity Futures 
                                                                                                             
 7. Jason P.W. Halperin & David Siegal, Fraud in Cryptocurrency, and How the SEC Is Applying 
Federal Securities Laws to Stop It, LAW.COM (Mar. 6, 2019, 2:30 PM), 
https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2019/03/06/fraud-in-cryptocurrency-and-how-the-sec-is-
applying-federal-securities-laws-to-stop-it/?slreturn=20190803093320 [https://perma.cc/5PT8-M77U]. 
 8. See, e.g., SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 395 (2004). 
“Congress’ purpose in enacting the securities laws was to regulate investments, in 
whatever form they are made and by whatever name they are called.” To that end, it 
enacted a broad definition of “security,” sufficient “to encompass virtually any 
instruments that might be sold as an investment.” 
Id. (quoting Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61 (1990)). 
 9. Jean Bacon et al., Blockchain Demystified: A Technical and Legal Introduction to Distributed 
and Centralised Ledgers, 25 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 1, 5 (2018). 
 10. See Press Release, Fin. Crimes Enf’t Network, U.S. Dep’t of the Treasury, FinCEN Issues 
Guidance on Virtual Currencies and Regulatory Responsibilities (Mar. 18, 2013), 
https://www.fincen.gov/news/news-releases/fincen-issues-guidance-virtual-currencies-and-regulatory-
responsibilities [https://perma.cc/M2YY-MANX]. 
 11. See Kevin Drawbaugh & Patrick Temple-West, Bitcoins Are Property, Not Currency, IRS Says 
Regarding Taxes, REUTERS (Mar. 25, 2014, 2:37 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-bitcoin-
irs/bitcoins-are-property-not-currency-irs-says-regarding-taxes-idUSBREA2O1LR20140325 
[https://perma.cc/9KCN-9ETE]. The article also related that the IRS statement clarified that “virtual 
currency is not to be treated as legal-tender currency to determine if a transaction causes a foreign 
currency gain or loss under U.S. tax law.” Id. 
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Modernization Act of 2000.12 The U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) acknowledged the CFTC classification in 
December 2017; however, there still has been overlapping 
jurisdiction, as the SEC has taken repeated disciplinary actions 
against companies determined to invest in Bitcoin or other forms of 
cryptocurrency for misleading disclosures to shareholders.13 
However, relatively unaddressed is the issue of classifying a Bitcoin 
investment (or any other cryptocurrency) for purposes of the federal 
securities laws enacted over seventy-five years before the advent of 
virtual and cryptocurrencies. 
B.   Brief History of the Federal Securities Laws 
The federal securities laws of 1933 and 1934 were a drastic 
reaction to the Wall Street folly that almost bankrupted the nation. 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Congress were eager to restore 
investor confidence and reacted to profligate speculation by creating 
remedial laws with expansive reach.14 The purpose of these laws was 
to provide investor protection through mandatory disclosure and anti-
                                                                                                             
 12. Order Instituting Proceedings Pursuant to Sections 6(c) and 6(d) of the Commodity Exchange 
Act Making Findings and Imposing Remedial Sanctions, In re TeraExchange LLC, CFTC No. 15-33, 
2015 WL 5658082 (Sept. 4, 2015), 
https://www.cftc.gov/sites/default/files/idc/groups/public/@lrenforcementactions/documents/legalpleadi
ng/enfteraexchangeorder92415.pdf [https://perma.cc/N3QY-8EBB]. 
 13. See discussion infra Section II.B.2. 
 14. Promptly after his inauguration, President Roosevelt began to push for securities reform, based 
on the idea that disclosing adequate information to investors would lessen or eliminate the specter of 
fraud. The idea was not to have the federal government sign off on the soundness of any particular 
investment, but rather to require issuers to provide investors with necessary and material information 
upon which to make investment decisions. In his message to Congress on March 29, 1933, President 
Roosevelt said: 
Of course, the Federal Government cannot and should not take any action which 
might be construed as approving or guaranteeing that newly issued securities are 
sound in the sense that their value will be maintained or that the properties which they 
represent will earn profit. There is, however, an obligation upon us to insist that every 
issue of new securities to be sold in interstate commerce shall be accompanied by full 
publicity and information, and that no essentially important element attending the 
issue shall be concealed from the buying public. 
H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 2 (1933). As has been noted, even before President Roosevelt worked to repeal 
Prohibition and reward voters with a drink of alcohol, he worked to revamp the oversight of the stock 
exchanges. See J. SCOTT COLESANTI, FAIRNESS, INC.: THE ORIGINS (AND BILLION-DOLLAR 
BONUSES) OF RULE 10B-5 AS AMERICA’S INSIDER TRADING PROHIBITION 4 (2018). 
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fraud provisions.15 The first of these laws, the Securities Act of 1933 
(1933 Act), is known as the “truth in securities” law and has two 
primary goals: to make sure investors have material information 
about possible investments and to prevent fraud in the purchase and 
sale of securities.16 Neither the 1933 Act nor the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934 (1934 Act) was intended to provide a broad federal 
remedy for all fraud.17 Instead, these statutes apply only to those 
investments that are within their broad statutory definition of 
“security.”18 Courts often reference a need for flexibility in applying 
the definition of security.19 
Cognizant of the remedial goals of the 1933 Act, Congress tried to 
craft a broad definition that would “meet the countless and variable 
schemes devised by those who seek the use of the money of others on 
the promise of profits.”20 Thus, Congress included (but failed to 
define) in the list of kinds of securities the catchall phrase 
                                                                                                             
 15.  SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 299 (1946). According to the Supreme Court, the 
statutory purpose of the securities laws is “compelling full and fair disclosure relative to the issuance of 
‘the many types of instruments that in our commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a 
security.’” Id. (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 11 (1933)); see also SEC v. Capital Gains Research 
Bureau, 375 U.S. 180, 186 (1963) (holding that the primary purpose of the federal securities laws is to 
“substitute a philosophy of full disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor”). Moreover, “[o]ne of 
[the 1934 Act’s] central purposes is to protect investors through the requirement of full disclosure by 
issuers of securities . . . .” Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967). Thus, the design of the 
statute was to “protect investors by promoting full disclosure of information thought necessary to 
informed investment decisions.” SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119, 124 (1953) (citing A.C. Frost 
& Co. v. Coeur D’Alene Mines Corp., 312 U.S. 38, 40 (1941)). “[T]he Court repeatedly has described 
the ‘fundamental purpose’ of the Act as implementing a ‘philosophy of full disclosure . . . .’” Santa Fe 
Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477–78 (1977) (quoting Capital Gains, 375 U.S. at 186). 
 16. See Ralston Purina, 346 U.S. at 124 n.10. 
 17. See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551, 556 (1982); see also Northland Capital Corp. v. 
Silver, 735 F.2d 1421, 1431 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Baurer v. Planning Group, Inc., 669 F.2d 770, 775 (D.C. 
Cir. 1981). 
 18. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b(a)(1), 78c (2018). Both statutes provide a laundry list of categories and 
examples of “securities,” including “any interest or instrument commonly known as a ‘security,’” to 
sweep in the varied types of instruments Congress predicted would (or should) fall within the term. 
§§ 77b(a)(1), 78c(10). 
 19. See, e.g., SEC v. Mut. Benefits Corp., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1339 (S.D. Fla. 2004), aff’d, 408 
F.3d 737 (11th Cir. 2005) (stating that “[f]irst and foremost, the federal securities laws were drafted and 
have consistently been interpreted from the perspective that flexibility in the law’s applicability is 
paramount”). 
 20. Id. at 1341 (quoting Howey, 328 U.S. at 299). “Congress’ purpose in enacting the securities laws 
was to regulate investments, in whatever form they are made and by whatever name they are 
called.” Reves v. Ernst & Young, 494 U.S. 56, 61 (1990). 
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“investment contract” to give the courts flexibility in interpreting this 
important and far-reaching definition.21 The U.S. Supreme Court 
availed itself of that flexibility, aggrandizing jurisdiction in crafting a 
case law test that has come to be known as the “Howey test.”22 The 
resulting common law standard (like so much of securities law) 
results in case-by-case determinations of the threshold question to 
any dispute.23 
                                                                                                             
 21. Reves, 494 U.S. at 64. “Throughout the history of struggling for an appropriate definition, courts 
have been mindful of the fact that the bottom-line question is whether the particular investment or 
instrument involved is one that needs or demands the investor protection of the federal (or state) 
securities laws.” THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 30–31 (3d ed. 1996). 
 22. Howey, 328 U.S. at 293 (1946). The first U.S. Supreme Court case to interpret the definition of 
investment contract in the 1933 Act was SEC v. C.M. Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943). Joiner 
involved the offer and sale of assignments in oil leases, coupled with the promoter’s promise to drill test 
wells. Joiner, 320 U.S. 345–46. The Court, in finding such offers to constitute investment contracts, 
adopted a broad reading of the term investment contract. Id. at 351. In determining whether a given 
investment was an investment contract, the Joiner court looked to “what character the instrument is 
given in commerce by the terms of the offer, the plan of distribution, and the economic inducements 
held out to the prospect.” Id. at 352–53. Three years later, the Court refined the definition of investment 
contract in the seminal case of SEC v. W.J. Howey, 328 U.S. 293 (1946). In Howey, the Supreme Court 
held that if “a person invests his money in a common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from 
the efforts of the promoter or a third party,” the investment scheme is an investment contract for 
purposes of the Securities Act. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299. The Howey definition of investment contract 
“permits the fulfillment of the statutory purpose of compelling full and fair disclosure relative to the 
issuance of ‘the many types of instruments that in our commercial world fall within the ordinary concept 
of a security.’” Id. (citing H.R. REP. NO. 73-85, at 11 (1933)). Additional support for this idea comes 
from Tcherepnin v. Knight, where the Court stated that “[i]n searching for the meaning and scope of the 
word ‘security’ in the Act, form should be disregarded for substance and the emphasis should be on 
economic reality.” 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967) (citing Howey, 328 U.S. at 298). The Court’s statement in 
Howey has been refined in the last half-century, with little substantive change, into the test used by 
courts today to determine whether an investment scheme is a security for purposes of the Securities Act. 
“After half a century, Howey still states the test for determining the existence of an investment contract. 
In the intervening years, litigation has not focused on the correctness of the test, but rather on the precise 
meaning of one or more of its parts.” LARRY D. SODERQUIST, SECURITIES REGULATION § 5:2.2, at 5-4 
(3d ed. 1994). For a more detailed history of the Howey test, see Miriam R. Albert, The Howey Test 
Turns 64: Are the Courts Grading This Test on a Curve?, 2 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 1 (2011). 
 23. The lack of a statutory definition creates opportunities as well as limitations: 
Conceptually, the lack of a statutory definition provides an opportunity for progress 
on both the disclosure and anti-fraud fronts. Courts have the flexibility to bring within 
the reach of the securities laws those interests that would not otherwise constitute 
securities, but nonetheless are the kind of investments that trigger a need for investor 
protection through mandatory, accurate disclosure. This flexibility also creates the 
opportunity for inconsistent or unsound interpretations of the definition, potentially 
triggering instability for the investing public. 
Albert, supra note 22, at 11. 
7
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Conversely, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code (the Code), adopted in its 
current form in 1978, contains statutory definitions of a much more 
definite character. Section 101(49) largely mirrors the securities law 
legislative definition, though § 1145 expressly exempts certain 
arrangements from those set categories (e.g., “note”).24 The Code 
focuses on much more conventional securities products; moreover, a 
lack of certainty in discharging the debtor is the chief ill to be 
avoided.25 
I.   Statutory and Common Law Approaches to Defining a Security 
A.   The Securities Act of 1933 
From its inception, § 2(a)(1) of the 1933 Act contained a veritable 
laundry list of arrangements that arise under American securities 
laws. In its current form, the statutory definition of security reads as 
follows: 
The term “security” means any note, stock, treasury stock, 
security future, security-based swap, bond, debenture, 
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or 
participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-
trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, 
transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust 
certificate, certificate of deposit for a security, fractional 
undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral rights, any 
put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, 
certificate of deposit, or group or index of securities 
(including any interest therein or based on the value 
thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege 
entered into on a national securities exchange relating to 
foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument 
commonly known as a “security[,]” or any certificate of 
                                                                                                             
 24. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101(49), 1145 (2018). 
 25. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 727 (2018). 
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interest or participation in, temporary or interim certificate 
for, receipt for, guarantee of, or warrant or right to 
subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.26 
None of these examples expressly touch on bankruptcy estate assets. 
Of the definition’s myriad possibilities, the SEC seized upon 
investment contract as a catchall, as explained below.27 
B.   The Howey Test 
Although the SEC has rarely shied from an opportunity to expand 
its jurisdiction,28 the investing public can remain calm because any 
overreaching by the SEC would arguably be tempered by the modest 
remedy sought of registration under § 5 of the 1933 Act.29 A primary 
means of such expansion by the SEC is via an ever-expanding notion 
of an investment contract, a term included but not defined in the 
seminal securities laws.30 From 1946 through the present, a common 
                                                                                                             
 26. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2018). 
 27. J. Scott Colesanti, Trotting Out the White Horse: How the SEC Can Handle Bitcoin’s Threat to 
American Investors, 65 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 37 (2014). 
 28. In its effort to further investor protection, the SEC has maintained, with varying degrees of 
success, that the concept of investment contract includes many financial schemes not specifically 
mentioned by the federal securities laws, thereby honoring the Supreme Court’s instruction that, “in 
searching for the meaning and scope of the word ‘security’ . . . form should be disregarded for substance 
and the emphasis should be on economic reality.” Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967). 
 29. Colesanti, supra note 27, at 37. 
[A]rmed with a broad definition, incalculable judicial support, and a mandate from 
the investing public, the SEC has used section 5 of the 1933 Act to exercise 
jurisdiction over arrangements far removed from those securities traded on stock 
exchanges, and to counter faddish investment frenzies centering on, among others, 
farm cooperative notes, condominiums, and collateralized debt obligations (including 
those of the synthetic genre). Even when a jurisdiction has seemingly closed the door 
on SEC jurisdiction, facts often surface permitting the case to proceed. 
Id. at 37–38 (citations omitted). 
 30. The lack of a statutory definition creates opportunities as well as limitations: 
Conceptually, the lack of a statutory definition provides an opportunity for progress 
on both the disclosure and anti-fraud fronts. Courts have the flexibility to bring within 
the reach of the securities laws those interests that would not otherwise constitute 
securities, but nonetheless are the kind of investments that trigger a need for investor 
protection through mandatory, accurate disclosure. This flexibility also creates the 
opportunity for inconsistent or unsound interpretations of the definition, potentially 
triggering instability for the investing public. 
Albert, supra note 22, at 11. Further, one commentator explained: 
The term was included in the definitional section of the Federal Securities Act of 
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law test has been employed in justifying the actions of an agency 
formed in 1934 to combat Wall Street fraudsters, successfully 
reaching Ponzi schemers, foreign defendants, and novel forms of 
enterprise such as viatical settlements.31 And in recent years, this 
intentionally flexible common law test has been applied to the robust 
number of innovative financing schemes in the area of digital 
currencies.32 
1.   The Howey Test Before Cryptocurrencies 
The Howey test fleshes out what constitutes an investment contract 
for purposes of the federal securities laws.33 The term had no 
standard meaning in any commercial context, although it appeared in 
several states’ blue sky laws before the 1933 Act.34 The test seeks to 
identify transactions in which investors are relying on others to 
manage the enterprise that will produce financial returns on their 
                                                                                                             
1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77b, as well as many state securities laws for a particular reason: 
the drafters of these statutes realized that, at one point in time, they could not predict 
all the various investment products the ingenuity of participants in the securities 
business could concoct. In effect then, the term investment contract can be analogized 
to an expansion joint as it provides flexibility and adds a universal quality to the 
definition of investment security. This is especially true in the federal domain, and in 
particular, the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a et seq. It was because the 
courts imposed an expansive construction of federal securities law that a definition 
evolved for the term investment contract. For, standing alone, the term would be 
meaningless. 
Willis H. Riccio, The Ubiquitous Investment Contract, 56 R.I. B.J. 15, 15 (2007). 
 31. See generally Miriam Albert, The Future of Death Futures: Why Viatical Settlements Must Be 
Classified as Securities, 19 PACE L. REV. 345 (1990). 
 32.  NASAA Expands Annual Top Investor Threat List, NORTH AM. SEC. ADMINS. ASS’N (Oct. 13, 
2013), http://www.nasaa.org/27012/nasaa-expands-annual-top-investor-threats-list/ 
[https://perma.cc/XYJ9-N5T5] (explaining the North American Securities Administrators Association 
expanded its “Annual Top Investor Threat” list to include digital currencies in 2013); see Colesanti, 
supra note 27, at 37–38 for a discussion of Bitcoin and its multiple sources and uses. 
 33. Colesanti, supra note 27, at 27–28 (“[T]he Howey decision of 1946 began a ceaseless period of 
brashly applying the Securities Acts to nonconventional securities—an ever-growing list of investments 
the First Circuit has coined ‘a kaleidoscopic assortment of pecuniary arrangements that defy 
categorization.’ This expansive reading of the statute is buttressed by court decisions noting the lack of 
other regulatory remedies—the Supreme Court has even expressly tilted the scales in favor of finding a 
security when the instruments in question ‘would escape federal regulation entirely if the [Securities] 
Acts were held not to apply.’”) (citations omitted). 
 34. See GARY M. BROWN, SECURITIES LAW AND PRACTICE DESKBOOK § 5:2.2, at 5-3 (6th ed. 
2012). 
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investments.35 These investors are deemed to be more vulnerable 
without the disclosure that would come from registration under the 
federal securities laws than investors who are participating in the 
management of the enterprise. Under Howey, any interest that 
“involves an investment of money in a common enterprise with 
profits to come solely from the efforts of others” is an investment 
contract,36 thereby included within the definition of security and 
subject to the rules and regulations of the federal securities laws.37 
The Supreme Court’s definition of investment contract in Howey is 
intentionally flexible,38 and thus consistent with the congressional 
approach to defining the broader concept of what constitutes a 
security.39 Although the Court has said that when analyzing whether 
an investment opportunity is a security, “form should be disregarded 
for substance”40 and the emphasis should be on “the economic 
realities underlying a transaction, and not on the name appended 
thereto,”41 the choice of a flexible definition has led “to complex and 
fact-intensive judicial inquiries in the application” of the test, 
allowing for inconsistent results across “courts engaging in such 
inquiries, creating the possibility of similarly-situated litigants 
winding up with dissimilar outcomes.”42 
The Howey test is typically described as having four prongs.43 The 
first prong requires an investment of money.44 Courts have held that 
cash is not the only form of contribution or investment that will 
                                                                                                             
 35. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 298–99 (1946). 
 36. Id. 
 37. 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (2018). 
 38. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299. This definition embodies a “flexible rather than a static principle, one 
that is capable of adaptation to meet the countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek the 
use of the money of others on the promise of profits.” Id. The test “permits the fulfillment of the 
statutory purpose of compelling full and fair disclosure relative to the issuance of ‘the many types of 
instruments that in our commercial world fall within the ordinary concept of a security.’” Id. 
 39. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 847–48 (1975). 
 40. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389 U.S. 332, 336 (1967). 
 41. United Hous. Found., 421 U.S. at 849. 
 42. See Albert, supra note 22, at 8–9, 11, 16–19 for a discussion of the specter of inconsistent 
interpretation or application by the lower courts threatening to undermine the utility of the Howey test 
itself as a trigger for investor protection. 
 43. See, e.g., Albert, supra note 22, at 15. 
 44. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946). 
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satisfy this prong.45 This prong has been interpreted to include cash, 
promissory notes,46 and bartered-for goods and services.47 The 
investment of money element is met when an investor parts with 
consideration with the hope of some future return.48 And as one 
commentator aptly noted, “It appears that any nuanced reading of the 
first element is subsumed in subsequent [t]est factors.”49 
The second prong requires that the investment of money be in a 
common enterprise.50 The Supreme Court in Howey made a showing 
of fact to support a finding of commonality but failed to define the 
contours of this required commonality, leaving it to the lower courts 
to flesh out.51 Two tests have developed to satisfy the requirement of 
commonality. First, this prong can be satisfied in some circuits 
through “horizontal commonality,” which focuses on the connection 
between and among the investors (i.e., looking for investors sharing 
the risk of the enterprise by sharing profits and losses 
proportionately).52 The alternate approach taken by some circuits is 
known as “vertical commonality,” focusing on the connection 
between the promoter and investors and looking to see if “the 
fortunes of the investor are interwoven with and dependent upon the 
                                                                                                             
 45. Uselton v. Commercial Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc., 940 F.2d 564, 574 (10th Cir. 1991). 
 46. Hector v. Wiens, 533 F.2d 429, 432–33 (9th Cir. 1976). 
 47. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 560–61 (1979). But see United States v. Jones, 
450 F.2d 523, 525 (5th Cir. 1971) (finding airline ticket vouchers were not securities due to purposes set 
out in 18 U.S.C. § 2311 on the prohibition against carriage of forged instruments, even where such 
provision—which largely echoed the 1933 Act and 1934 Act definitional sections—specifically 
included “evidence of indebtedness”). 
 48. See BROWN, supra note 34, § 5:2.2A, at 5-5. 
 49. Colesanti, supra note 27, at 32. 
 50. SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, 301 (1946). 
 51. Christopher L. Borsani, A “Common” Problem: Examining the Need for Common Ground in the 
“Common Enterprise” Element of the Howey Test, 10 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 1, 4 (2008); see also Jonathan E. 
Shook, Note, The Common Enterprise Test: Getting Horizontal or Going Vertical in Wals v. Fox Hills 
Development Corp., 30 TULSA L. REV. 727, 732–33 (1995) (citing Shawn Hill Crook, Comment, What 
is a Common Enterprise? Horizontal and Vertical Commonality in an Investment Contract Analysis, 19 
CUMB. L. REV. 323, 325 (1989) (“Unfortunately, because neither the Court in Howey nor any 
subsequent Supreme Court decision has defined the ‘common enterprise’ prong of the Howey test, the 
federal courts have been left to disagree.”)). 
 52. Albert, supra note 22, at 16–17. 
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efforts and success of those seeking the investment or of third 
parties.”53 
The third prong requires that the investment be undertaken with 
the expectation of profits.54 This expectation cannot be of additional 
contributions, and the return on investment must be the principal 
motivation for the investment.55 This prong is often “synonymous 
with the marketing of the financial arrangement[s]” particular to the 
given investment and is often demonstrated by a promoter’s “wistful 
statements or advertising of successful commercial activities.”56 
The fourth prong requires the expectation of profits to be from the 
efforts of others.57 Recall the goal of the federal securities laws is to 
provide investor protection through mandatory disclosure and anti-
fraud regulations. Here, the passive investor is in much greater need 
of these protections than an investor involved in running the 
investment.58 This prong has seen significant movement since Howey 
was decided. The original language in Howey required that the 
investment of money in this common enterprise be undertaken with 
the expectation of profits solely from the efforts of others.59 The 
limitations inherent in prohibiting the expectation of profits by the 
investor would exclude any investment that involved even the most 
minimal effort from the investors from the protection of the securities 
                                                                                                             
 53. SEC v. Glenn W. Turner Enters., Inc., 474 F.2d 476, 482 n.7 (9th Cir. 1973); Colesanti, supra 
note 27, at 33–34 (“[V]ertical commonality was juridically divided into strict and broad varieties, 
enthusiastically embraced by litigants and opportunistically utilized by the SEC. ‘Strict’ vertical 
commonality requires that the economic fates of the Promoter and Investor be tied and that their 
fortunes rise and fall together; the focus rests upon a closely-aligned ‘one-to-one relationship between 
the investor and investment manager.’ Conversely, ‘broad’ vertical commonality requires only that the 
‘efforts’ of Promoter and Investor be ‘linked.’ The Supreme Court has not determined which, if any, of 
the versions is universally required.”). 
 54. Howey, 328 U.S. at 301. 
 55. Albert, supra note 22, at 19. Many courts combine the third and fourth components, and thus 
refer to the test as a three-part test. See, e.g., Warfield v. Alaniz, 569 F.3d 1015, 1020 (9th Cir. 
2009) (citing SEC v. Rubera, 350 F.3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2003)) (“We distilled Howey’s definition into a 
three-part test . . . .”); SEC v. Life Partners, 87 F.3d. 536, 534 (D.C. Cir. 1997). This combination is 
supportable, as the full idea is that the investor has an expectation of profit and that expectation must 
come, to a large measure, from the efforts of someone other than the investor. 
 56. Colesanti, supra note 27, at 34–35. 
 57. Howey, 328 U.S. at 301. 
 58. See Albert, supra note 22, at 12. 
 59. Howey, 328 U.S. at 301. 
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laws—arguably defeating the goals of the securities laws 
themselves.60 The Supreme Court began to walk back the “solely” 
language in United Housing Foundation v. Forman, with its 
comment that the “touchstone is the presence of an investment in a 
common venture premised on a reasonable expectation of profits to 
be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.”61 
The Howey test, for better or for worse, is what courts and 
investors are left with to determine whether a given opportunity is an 
investment contract and thus within the reach of the federal securities 
laws, specifically the registration and prospectus delivery 
requirements of § 5. As Professor Colesanti previously noted: 
Overall, despite some hiccups, Howey transformed the 
1933 Act and 1934 Act into dynamic statutes that would 
forever value the dual promises of section 5 (i.e., 
registration and prospectus delivery). Moreover, the federal 
bench has continued to uphold Howey’s promise of 
protection for [i]nvestors in securities traditional or 
otherwise; such continued protection is laudable for, among 
other reasons, the vulnerability and political nature of 
agency-made law in general.62 
2.   The SEC’s Response to Cryptocurrencies 
The SEC has not been shy about using the Howey test to attempt to 
rein in “the countless and variable schemes devised by those who 
seek the use of the money of others on the promise of profits.”63 The 
world of cryptocurrency is fertile ground for SEC intervention. 
Commentators have debated whether and how cryptocurrencies 
                                                                                                             
 60. Robinson v. Glynn, 349 F.3d 166, 170 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 61. United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975). 
 62. Colesanti, supra note 27 (citing THOMAS LEE HAZEN, PRINCIPLES OF SECURITIES REGULATION 
328–29 (2d. ed. 2006); then citing WILLIAM F. FOX, UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 54–57 
(6th ed. 2012)) (noting that the federal agencies’ “administrator[s are] totally subject to Presidential 
control”). 
 63. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299. 
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should be regulated, with the debate clearly illustrating that any path 
to regulation was not self-evident from the language of the 1933 and 
1934 Acts.64 Under certain circumstances, the SEC has declared that 
both vehicles purchasing cryptocurrency and ICOs themselves 
constitute sales of securities warranting formal registration with the 
agency (and related public disclosures).65 The first relevant holding 
was in 2013.66 
a.   SEC v. Shavers 
One of the SEC’s earliest actions in this area was SEC v. Shavers, 
in which the SEC delved into whether a fund designed to trade 
Bitcoin constituted an investment contract under Howey, specifically 
finding that the use of Bitcoin satisfied the first prong of the Howey 
test.67 Trendon Shavers, the founder and operator of Bitcoin Savings 
and Trust (BTCST), solicited lenders to invest in Bitcoin-related 
opportunities,68 and “[t]he SEC assert[ed] that Shavers made a 
number of misrepresentations to investors . . . and . . . defrauded 
investors.”69 Shavers challenged the court’s subject matter 
jurisdiction, arguing that the BTCST investments are not securities 
because Bitcoin is not “money.”70 
                                                                                                             
 64. See generally Colesanti, supra note 27 (calling for more active SEC regulation of Bitcoin). For a 
broader, generalized call for regulatory action, see Ruoke Yang, When Is Bitcoin A Security Under U.S. 
Securities Laws?, 18 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 99, 114–15 (2013) (concluding that Bitcoin itself satisfies all 
prongs of the Howey test). 
 65. See, e.g., Order Instituting Cease-And-Desist Proceedings Pursuant to Section 8A of the 
Securities Act of 1933, Making Findings, and Imposing a Cease-and-Desist Order at 8, Munchee Inc., 
Securities Act Release No. 10445, 118 SEC Docket 975 (Dec. 11, 2017) [hereinafter Munchee Order]. 
 66. SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2013 WL 4028182, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 6, 2013). 
 67. SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2014 WL 12622292, at *4 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2014) (order 
granting in part and denying in part defendants’ motion for reconsideration). Bitcoin was such a new 
phenomenon that the court needed to find a viable definition and description. This led to one ground for 
appeal by Mr. Shavers, who argued that the court had improperly relied “upon a second-year law 
student’s law review article.” Id. The court notes that it did rely on the article by Derek A. Dion, I’ll 
Glady Trade You Two Bits on Tuesday for a Byte Today: Bitcoin, Regulating Fraud in the E-Conomy of 
Hacker-Cash, 2013 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 165, 167 (2013), but only for a definition and 
description of Bitcoin. Id. 
 68. Shavers, 2013 WL 4028182, at *1. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
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Unsurprisingly, the SEC disagreed and argued “that the BTCST 
investments are both investment contracts and notes, and thus, are 
securities.”71 The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Texas 
agreed, finding that the BTCST investments were in fact investments 
of money because Bitcoin could be used as money to purchase goods 
and services and could be exchanged for “conventional” currencies.72 
Accordingly, the court found that “Bitcoin is a currency or form of 
money, and investors wishing to invest in BTCST provided an 
investment of money.”73 
Next, the court applied the Fifth Circuit’s vertical commonality 
test requiring “interdependence between the investors and the 
promotor” and found that the investors were dependent on Shavers’s 
expertise in Bitcoin markets and his local connections.74 Finally, the 
court found that any investors participating in the BTCST 
investments were expecting profits from Shavers’s efforts.75 
Accordingly, the investments sold by Shavers were deemed 
investment contracts and thus securities.76 
b.   The DAO Report 
Whether cryptocurrencies are investment contracts and thus 
securities is the subject of an SEC release entitled “Report of 
Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934: The DAO” (the DAO Report).77 The DAO Report 
reiterates the fundamental principles of the federal securities laws 
                                                                                                             
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at *2. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Shavers, 2013 WL 4028182, at *2. 
 75. Id. The court noted that “Shavers began advertising that he was in the business of ‘selling 
Bitcoin to a group of local people’ and offered investors up to 1% interest daily ‘until either you 
withdraw the funds or my local dealings dry up and I can no longer be profitable.’” Id. at *1. The court 
found this sufficient to demonstrate an expectation of profits from his efforts. Id. at *2. 
 76. Id. at *2. 
 77. Report of Investigation Pursuant to Section 21(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934: The 
DAO at 1, Exchange Act Release No. 81207, 117 SEC Docket 745 (July 25, 2017) [hereinafter DAO 
Report]. “The DAO is one example of a Decentralized Autonomous Organization, which is a term used 
to describe a ‘virtual’ organization embodied in computer code and executed on a distributed ledger or 
blockchain.” Id. at 1. 
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and “describes their applicability to a new paradigm—virtual 
organizations or capital raising entities that use distributed ledger or 
blockchain technology to facilitate capital raising and/or investment 
and the related offer and sale of securities.”78 The DAO Report 
concludes that DAO Tokens are in fact securities, and so the SEC 
provides typical cautionary language stressing issuers’ obligations to 
comply with the federal securities laws:79 
The Commission is aware that virtual organizations and 
associated individuals and entities increasingly are using 
distributed ledger technology to offer and sell instruments 
such as DAO Tokens to raise capital. These offers and sales 
have been referred to, among other things, as “Initial Coin 
Offerings” or “Token Sales.” Accordingly, the Commission 
deems it appropriate and in the public interest to issue this 
Report in order to stress that the U.S. federal securities law 
may apply to various activities, including distributed ledger 
technology, depending on the particular facts and 
circumstances, without regard to the form of the 
organization or technology used to effectuate a particular 
offer or sale.80 
In the DAO Report, the SEC, although deciding against 
enforcement action, declared that Slock.it, a German cyberspace 
corporation holding “a corpus of assets through the sale of DAO 
Tokens to investors,” had sold securities under American securities 
laws.81 In less than one month during the spring of 2016, Slock.it 
sold over 1 billion DAO Tokens.82 The SEC did not bring an 
enforcement action against Slock.it because a hacker stole 
                                                                                                             
 78. Id. at 2. 
 79. Id. at 3. 
 80. Id. at 10. 
 81. See generally id. 
 82. DAO Report, supra note 77, at 5. The DAO’s intended purpose was to “blaze a new path in 
business for the betterment of its members, existing simultaneously nowhere and everywhere and 
operating solely with the steadfast iron will of unstoppable code.” Id. 
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approximately one-third of the DAO’s assets after the DAO Tokens 
were sold but before the DAO was able to begin financing the 
project.83 
In applying the Howey test to DAO Tokens, the SEC first 
concluded that the investors in DAO Tokens did invest money, 
although no traditional currency changed hands.84 Money would 
typically connote currency, but the case law supports the idea that 
cash is not the only form of contribution or investment needed for the 
finding of an investment contract.85 The SEC found that DAO 
Tokens investors used Ether (ETH), a virtual currency used on a 
decentralized platform that runs smart contracts, known as the 
Ethereum Blockchain, to make their investments.86 Each investor 
tendered ETH in exchange for DAO Tokens. Despite the lack of 
traditional currency to satisfy Howey’s “investment of money” prong, 
the SEC concluded that the investment in DAO Tokens “is the type 
of contribution of value that can create an investment contract under 
Howey.”87 
The SEC combined discussion of the commonality prong of the 
Howey test with the DAO Tokens in its discussion of the “reasonable 
expectation of profits” prong of the Howey test.88 The only reference 
to the commonality requirement is the SEC’s unsupported conclusion 
that DAO Token investors were investing in a common enterprise.89 
The SEC devoted more analysis to the expectation of profits prong 
                                                                                                             
 83. Id. at 1. 
 84. Id. at 11. 
 85. Id. (citing Uselton v. Comm. Lovelace Motor Freight, Inc., 940 F.2d 564, 574 (10th Cir. 1991) 
(citations omitted)); see also Munchee Order, supra note 65. (“Munchee offered and sold MUN tokens 
in a general solicitation that included potential investors in the United States. Investors paid Ether or 
Bitcoin to purchase their MUN tokens. Such investment is the type of contribution of value that can 
create an investment contract.”). See supra Section II.B.2.a. for a discussion of SEC v. Shavers. 
 86. DAO Report, supra note 77, at 11. 
 87. Uselton, 940 F.2d at 574 (“[T]he ‘investment’ may take the form of ‘goods and services,’ or 
some other ‘exchange of value.’”); DAO Report, supra note 77, at 11 (citing SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-
CV-416, 2014 WL 12622292, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 2014) (order granting in part and denying in 
part defendants’ motion for reconsideration) (finding that an investment of Bitcoin, a virtual currency, 
meets the first prong of Howey)). 
 88. DAO Report, supra note 77, at 11. 
 89. Id. 
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and noted that for purposes of the Howey test, profits can include 
“dividends, other periodic payments, or the increased value of the 
investment.”90 The DAO was a for-profit enterprise with the stated 
objective to fund projects in exchange for a return on investment.91 
Because DAO Token holders had the possibility of sharing in 
potential profits from the various contracts funded, the SEC 
concluded that “a reasonable investor would have been motivated, at 
least in part, by the prospects of profits on their investment of ETH in 
[t]he DAO.”92 
The final prong of the Howey test—that the profits be derived 
primarily from the managerial efforts of others—was met with DAO 
Tokens because the investors “relied on the managerial and 
entrepreneurial efforts of Slock.it, its co-founders, and [t]he DAO’s 
Curators, to manage [t]he DAO and put forth project proposals that 
could generate profits for [t]he DAO’s investors.”93 
The SEC made it clear that the federal securities laws apply to any 
and all investments that fall within the statutory definition of 
security: 
The registration requirements are designed to provide 
investors with procedural protections and material 
information necessary to make informed investment 
decisions. These requirements apply to those who offer and 
sell securities in the United States, regardless whether the 
issuing entity is a traditional company or a decentralized 
autonomous organization, regardless whether those 
securities are purchased using U.S. dollars or virtual 
currencies, and regardless whether they are distributed in 
certificated form or through distributed ledger 
                                                                                                             
 90. SEC v. Edwards, 540 U.S. 389, 394 (2004). 
 91. DAO Report, supra note 77, at 11–12. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. at 12. The SEC was not troubled by the DAO Token holders’ voting rights, finding that these 
rights “did not provide them with meaningful control over the enterprise because (1) DAO Token 
holders’ ability to vote for contracts was a largely perfunctory one; and (2) DAO Token holders were 
widely dispersed and limited in their ability to communicate with one another.” Id. at 14. 
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technology.94 
This SEC’s clear precedent became an injunction action not much 
later. 
c.   The Munchee Stop Order 
In 2017, the SEC halted an entrepreneurial offering commenced by 
Munchee Inc.95 Munchee, a California corporation, issued digital 
coins to budding restaurant critics for submitting a review of a local 
eatery.96 The SEC halted the offering on day two of its operation, 
which had been slated to earn $15 million from American 
purchasers.97 As the accompanying SEC settlement order stated: 
Under Section 2(a)(1) of the Securities Act, a security 
includes “an investment contract.” An investment contract 
is an investment of money in a common enterprise with a 
reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the 
entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others. [] The 
“touchstone” of an investment contract “is the presence of 
an investment in a common venture premised on a 
reasonable expectation of profits to be derived from the 
entrepreneurial or managerial efforts of others.” [] This 
definition embodies a “flexible rather than a static 
principle, one that is capable of adaptation to meet the 
countless and variable schemes devised by those who seek 
the use of the money of others on the promise of profits.”98 
 
An “initial coin offering” or “ICO” is a recently developed 
form of fundraising event in which an entity offers 
participants a unique digital “coin” or “token” in exchange 
                                                                                                             
 94. Id. at 18. 
 95. Munchee Order, supra note 65, at 1. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. at 2. 
 98. Id. at 8 (citations omitted). 
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for consideration (most commonly Bitcoin, Ether, or fiat 
currency). The tokens are issued and distributed on a 
“blockchain” or cryptographically-secured ledger. Tokens 
often are also listed and traded on online platforms, 
typically called virtual currency exchanges, and they 
usually trade for other digital assets or fiat currencies. 
Often, tokens are listed and tradeable immediately after 
they are issued.99 
That same month, the SEC Chair issued a warning to all potential 
ICO issuers that the securities laws would presumably apply to their 
deals: 
A key question for all ICO market participants: “Is the coin 
or token a security?” As securities law practitioners know 
well, the answer depends on the facts. For example, a token 
that represents a participation interest in a book-of-the-
month club may not implicate our securities laws, and may 
well be an efficient way for the club’s operators to fund the 
future acquisition of books and facilitate the distribution of 
those books to token holders. In contrast, many token 
offerings appear to have gone beyond this construct and are 
more analogous to interests in a yet-to-be-built publishing 
house with the authors, books[,] and distribution networks 
all to come. It is especially troubling when the promoters of 
these offerings emphasize the secondary market trading 
potential of these tokens. Prospective purchasers are being 
sold on the potential for tokens to increase in value—with 
the ability to lock in those increases by reselling the tokens 
on a secondary market —or to otherwise profit from the 
tokens based on the efforts of others. These are key 
                                                                                                             
 99. Id. at 3 n.1. 
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hallmarks of a security and a securities offering.100 
The Chair’s warning to investment professionals concurrently 
acknowledged a presumption that related parties would, where 
appropriate, be subject to the securities laws: 
I also caution market participants against promoting or 
touting the offer and sale of coins without first determining 
whether the securities laws apply to those actions. Selling 
securities generally requires a license, and experience 
shows that excessive touting in thinly traded and 
volatile markets can be an indicator of “scalping,” 
“pump and dump[,]” and other manipulations and 
frauds. Similarly, I also caution those who operate systems 
and platforms that effect or facilitate transactions in these 
products that they may be operating unregistered exchanges 
or broker–dealers that are in violation of the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.101 
To the extent the weight of the SEC’s vaunted Division of 
Enforcement was not readily comprehended, the Chair continued: 
On cryptocurrencies, I want to emphasize two points. First, 
while there are cryptocurrencies that do not appear to be 
securities, simply calling something a “currency” or a 
currency-based product does not mean that it is not a 
security. Before launching a cryptocurrency or a product 
with its value tied to one or more cryptocurrencies, its 
promoters must either (1) be able to demonstrate that the 
currency or product is not a security or (2) comply with 
applicable registration and other requirements under our 
                                                                                                             
 100. Jay Clayton, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement on Cryptocurrencies and Initial 
Coin Offerings (Dec. 11, 2017) [hereinafter Clayton Statement]. 
 101. Id. 
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securities laws.102 
d.   The Khaled and Mayweather Cases 
Approximately a year after the Munchee Order and the Chair’s 
warnings, the SEC made good on its advertised presumption that 
coins issued via ICOs are securities.103 Significantly, in accepting 
$900,000 to promote three ICOs on his Instagram, Twitter, and 
Facebook accounts, champion boxer Floyd Mayweather was found to 
have violated Section 17(b) of the Securities Act.104 In a 
much-publicized settlement with the boxer, the SEC imposed 
discipline upon Mayweather—an ordinary citizen, not a securities 
professional—for his paid endorsement of digital tokens.105 That 
SEC Order (Mayweather Order) tersely held, “Mayweather violated 
Section 17(b) of the Securities Act by touting three ICOs that 
involved the offer and sale of securities on his social media accounts 
without disclosing that he received compensation from an issuer for 
doing so, or the amount of the consideration.”106 
The Mayweather Order did not explain the application of § 5 or the 
Howey test to the ICOs in issue.107 The conclusion seems to be 
presumed, as it was in a companion settlement Order concluded with 
celebrity Khaled Mohamed Khaled, better known as DJ Khaled.108 
Mayweather consented to pay $600,000 in satisfaction of a fine and 
                                                                                                             
 102. Id. 
 103. Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings Pursuant to Section 8A of the Securities Act of 
1933, Making Findings, and Imposing a Cease-and-Desist Order at 2, Floyd Mayweather Jr., Securities 
Act Release No. 10578, 2018 WL 6266203 (Nov. 29, 2018) [hereinafter Mayweather Order]. 
 104. Id. at 2. The SEC continues to aggressively assert jurisdiction over digital transactions. On June 
4, 2019, the SEC announced that it had sued Kik Interactive Inc. for its online sales of coins to the 
public. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Charges Issuer with Conducting $100 
Million Unregistered ICO (June 4, 2019), https://www.sec.gov/news/press-release/2019-87 
[https://perma.cc/KXP8-4ZC3]. 
 105. Mayweather Order, supra note 103, at 5. 
 106. Id. at 4. 
 107. See id. 
 108. See Order Instituting Cease-and-Desist Proceedings Pursuant to Section 8A of the Securities Act 
of 1933, Making Findings, and Imposing a Cease-and-Desist Order at 3, Khaled Khaled, Securities Act 
Release No. 10579, 2018 WL 626624 (Nov. 29, 2018) [hereinafter Khaled Order]. 
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disgorgement, as well as the undertaking to refrain from further 
violations109 and Khaled agreed, for a two-year period, to: 
[F]orgo receiving or agreeing to receive any form of 
compensation or consideration, directly or indirectly, from 
any issuer, underwriter, or dealer, for directly or indirectly 
publishing, giving publicity to, or circulating any notice, 
circular, advertisement, newspaper, article, letter, 
investment service, or communication which, though not 
purporting to offer a security, digital or otherwise, for sale, 
describes such security.110 
Thus, between 2017 and the present, the SEC, in word and deed, 
expanded the scope of the securities laws to include ICOs. The SEC 
now benefits from unchallenged agency support, precedent in the 
form of SEC Orders, and a wealth of case law expanding application 
of the Howey test for over seventy years.111 Such branding accords 
the ICO depositor–investor, at first blush, an unsecured claim placed 
a distant second to secured creditors. The next Section traces the 
treatment of securities under the Bankruptcy Code through that 
storied law’s various incarnations.112 
                                                                                                             
 109. Mayweather Order, supra note 103, at 4. 
 110. Khaled Order, supra note 108, at 3. Of note is the SEC No-Action Letter of early April 2019, 
which permitted an ICO to move forward without registration of tokens representing air charter 
discounts where the issuer, among other things, did not emphasize the “potential for the increase in the 
market value of the Token” and the Token was limited to an immovable price of $1. See TurnKey Jet, 
Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, 2019 WL 1471132 (Apr. 3, 2019). 
 111. See, e.g., SEC v. Shavers, No. 4:13-CV-416, 2014 WL 12622292, at *1 (E.D. Tex. Aug. 26, 
2014) (order granting in part and denying in part defendants’ motion for reconsideration); Khaled Order, 
supra note 108, at 2, 4; DAO Report, supra note 77, at 18. 
 112. 11 U.S.C. § 101(49) (2018). 
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C.   The Bankruptcy Code On Securities and Section 510(b) 
“Subordination” 
1.   Traditionally 
In one sense, the contrast between the respective definitions of 
security residing within securities and bankruptcy law tells a story of 
statutory versus common law construction. However, the history 
behind the Bankruptcy Code reveals that the SEC was never truly 
distant from each generation’s notion of a level playing field for both 
creditors and investors. It is axiomatic that bankruptcy reorganization 
plans need to evaluate such practicalities as stock swaps, stock 
registration, and anti-fraud laws. Such investments as real estate 
partnerships, Bitcoin arrangements, LLCs, and commercial paper 
holdings beg for certainty before a plan can be confirmed. 
Significantly, congressional authority over bankruptcy proceedings 
is more clearly defined by the U.S. Constitution than many of its 
other powers.113 Specifically, Article I enables the federal legislature 
to “establish uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout 
the United States.”114 In the nineteenth century, three acts of 
Congress alternatively granted and rescinded an individual’s right to 
voluntary bankruptcy.115 The aim of marshaling property for 
redistribution gradually succumbed to that of debtor relief—often 
with strong opposition. 
The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 was the first permanent federal 
statute designed to provide American companies with relief from 
creditors.116 That seminal legislation was centered on banks, 
                                                                                                             
 113. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 114. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 115. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517, repealed by Act of June 7, 1878, ch. 160, 20 Stat. 99; 
Act of Aug. 9, 1841, ch. 9, § 1, 5 Stat. 440, 441–42, repealed by Act of Mar. 3, 1843, ch. 82, 5 Stat. 614; 
Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, § 1-2, 2 Stat. 19, 20–22, repealed by Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 
248; see Vincent L. Leibell, Jr., The Chandler Act—Its Effect Upon the Law of Bankruptcy, 9 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 380, 382–85 (1940). 
 116. Bankruptcy Act of 1898 (Nelson Act), ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, repealed by Bankruptcy Reform 
Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549; see David A. Skeel Jr., The Genius of the 1898 
Bankruptcy Act, 15 BANKR. DEV. J. 321, 326 (1999) (“Whereas the United States went long periods 
without federal bankruptcy, England had national bankruptcy laws on the books throughout the 
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merchants, and farmers.117 As one scholar explains, “In striking 
contrast to the tough, administrative British framework that emerged 
at the same time, American bankruptcy would have a minimalist 
administrative structure and comparatively generous provisions for 
the treatment and discharge of debtors.”118 
2.   The Chandler Act of 1938 
In 1938, Congress, via the Chandler Act, tilted the balance even 
more in favor of the debtor, as the Supreme Court memorialized in 
Local Loan Co. v. Hunt: 
One of the primary purposes of the Bankruptcy Act is to 
“relieve the honest debtor from the weight of oppressive 
indebtedness[] and permit him to start afresh free from the 
obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business 
misfortunes.” This purpose of the act has been again and 
again emphasized by the courts as being of public as well 
as private interest, in that it gives to the honest but 
unfortunate debtor who surrenders for distribution the 
property which he owns at the time of bankruptcy, a new 
opportunity in life and a clear field for future effort, 
unhampered by the pressure and discouragement of pre-
existing debt. The various provisions of the Bankruptcy Act 
were adopted in the light of that view and are to be 
construed when reasonably possible in harmony with it so 
as to effectuate the general purpose and policy of the act. 
Local rules subversive of that result cannot be accepted as 
controlling the action of a federal court.119 
                                                                                                             
nineteenth century.”). 
 117. Skeel, supra note 116, at 331–32. 
 118. Id. at 336. 
 119. Local Loan v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244–45 (1934) (citations omitted). 
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Concurrently, the Chandler Act prioritized customers over general 
creditors in claims against a “single and separate fund.”120 Thus 
Local Loan, a case deciding a $300 debt, would wind up impacting 
billions of dollars.121 
Since 2005, laws enacted and contemplated have targeted abuse by 
the debtor.122 However, the interplay of securities law and the Code 
remains a common law tangle.123 
Interestingly, the SEC was accorded administrative authority over 
bankruptcy filings by the 1938 Act.124 Separately, alarming 
brokerage house failures of the late 1960s prompted Congress to 
adopt the Securities Investor Protection Act of 1970 (SIPA).125 
Though seemingly extricating issues of investor status from the 
Bankruptcy Code, SIPA actually only supplants the Code when a 
registered brokerage firm becomes insolvent and its customers are 
left with empty accounts (i.e., it does not affect depositor–investors 
who have parted with money in favor of issuers, online or 
otherwise).126 
                                                                                                             
 120. A Brief History of Bankruptcy, BANKRUPTCYDATA , https://www.bankruptcydata.com/a-history-
of-bankruptcy [https://perma.cc/DBM3-7YFM] (last visited Oct. 20, 2019). 
 121. See Local Loan, 292 U.S. at 238, 245; A Brief History of Bankruptcy, supra note 120. 
 122. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-
8, 119 Stat. 23; Financial Institution Bankruptcy Act of 2017, H.R. Res. 1667, 115th Cong. § 2(e) 
(2017). 
 123. Bankruptcy courts often show deference to the securities laws when evaluating investments 
engaged in by debtors. See In re Flanagan, Nos. NV-13-1188-TaJuKi, NV-13-1189-TaJuKi, 2014 WL 
764371, at *7 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. Feb. 26, 2014) (applying the Howey test and finding “the bankruptcy 
court did not err in determining that the Agreement was not an ‘investment contract’ for the purposes of 
the Securities Act”); Williams v. Sato (In re Sato), 512 B.R. 241, 254 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2014) (applying 
the Howey test and finding “the transaction between the parties constitutes an investment contract under 
the federal test”); Estate of Adler v. SunTrust Bank, N.A. (In re American Capital Corp.), 425 B.R. 714, 
722 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2010) (applying the Howey test and finding “the guaranty fee notes attached to the 
Amended Complaint in this case do not involve the investment of money by any of the insider Plaintiffs, 
and thus are not ‘securities’ for purposes of the securities laws”). 
 124. Bankruptcy Act of 1938 (Chandler Act), Pub. L. No. 75-696, 52 Stat. 840 (repealed 1978). 
 125. 15 U.S.C. § 78lll (2018). 
 126. See id. 
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3.   The Modern Bankruptcy Code 
The present Bankruptcy Code (Title 11) was adopted in 1978,127 
with revisions to the appointment of Bankruptcy Court judges 
codified in 1984.128 Its fifteen chapters (spread over four titles) 
address, in turn, creditors, liquidation, reorganization, creditors, and 
readjustment of debts.129 The Code specifically defines security in a 
manner reminiscent of the 1933 Act: 
a.   Definitions 
Definitions are positioned within Title 11. Security is defined as 
follows: 
The term “security”—(A) includes—(i) note; (ii) stock; (iii) 
treasury stock; (iv) bond; (v) debenture; (vi) collateral trust 
certificate; (vii) pre-organization certificate or subscription; 
(viii) transferable share; (ix) voting-trust certificate; (x) 
certificate of deposit; (xi) certificate of deposit for security; 
(xii) investment contract or certificate of interest or 
participation in a profit-sharing agreement or in an oil, gas, 
or mineral royalty or lease, if such contract or interest is 
required to be the subject of a registration statement filed 
with the Securities and Exchange Commission under the 
provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, or is exempt under 
section 3(b) of such Act from the requirement to file such a 
statement; (xiii) interest of a limited partner in a limited 
partnership; (xiv) other claim or interest commonly known 
as “security”; and (xv) certificate of interest or participation 
in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, or 
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase or sell, 
                                                                                                             
 127. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101–12 (2018). 
 128. Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333. 
 129. 11 U.S.C. § 101 (2018). 
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a security . . . .130 
Section 101(49) of the Code continues by expressly exempting a 
list of instruments from the definition of security. That list includes 
items that can be grouped into cash or its equivalents (e.g., a check, 
bank letter of credit),131 special instruments defined elsewhere in the 
Code (e.g., a “leverage transaction,” as defined in § 761),132 certain 
transactions not subject to SEC registration requirements,133 
commodities–derivatives,134 or a debt for sold goods or services.135 
Conversely, the express exclusions are somewhat peculiar to the 
Code. These exclusions include: 
(i) [c]urrency, check, draft, bill of exchange, or bank letter 
of credit; (ii) leverage transaction, as defined in section 761 
of this title; (iii) commodity futures contract or forward 
contract; (iv) option, warrant, or right to subscribe to or 
purchase or sell a commodity futures contract; (v) option to 
purchase or sell a commodity; (vi) contract or certificate of 
a kind specified in subparagraph (A)(xii) of this paragraph 
that is not required to be the subject of a registration 
statement filed with the Securities and Exchange 
Commission and is not exempt under section 3(b) of the 
Securities Act of 1933 from the requirement to file such a 
statement; or (vii) debt or evidence of indebtedness for 
goods sold and delivered or services rendered.136 
Were it not for the overlapping jurisdiction between the SEC and 
CFTC over virtual currency arrangements, the Code might thus 
                                                                                                             
 130. Id. § 101(49). 
 131. Id. § 101(49)(i). 
 132. Id. § 101(49)(ii). 
 133. Id. § 101(49)(vi). 
 134. Id. § 101(49)(iii)–(v). 
 135. 11 U.S.C. § 101(49)(vii). 
 136. Id. 
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exclude all claims related to ICOs as “commodities.”137 However, the 
SEC has expressly preserved ICO jurisdiction, as explained above.138 
Accordingly, the investor–depositor faces the real problem of 
subordination under the Code, which is the subject of the next 
section.139 
b.   Section 510(b) of the Bankruptcy Code 
In both a Chapter 11 reorganization and a Chapter 7 liquidation, 
the shareholder of a corporation faces significant obstacles.140 In 
brief, the owner of debtor securities takes action upon the debtor’s 
filing for bankruptcy; at times, this action manifests itself as 
“rescission” of unregistered securities.141 At other times, the 
securities holder simply makes a claim, which is generally 
subordinated to creditors of both the secured and unsecured type.142 
Thus, in varied situations, the Code consistently relegates the 
shareholder claim to a posterior position in the order of payout.143 
Section 510(b) itself states as follows: 
For the purpose of distribution under this title, a claim 
arising from rescission of a purchase or sale of a security of 
the debtor or of an affiliate of the debtor, for damages 
                                                                                                             
 137. See Order Instituting Proceedings Pursuant to Sections 6(c) and 6(d) of the Commodity 
Exchange Act, Making Findings and Imposing Remedial Sanctions, In re Coinflip, Inc., CFTC No. 15-
29, 2015 WL 5535736 (Sept. 17, 2015). See generally Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable 
Relief and for Civil Monetary Penalties Under the Commodity Exchange Act and Commission 
Regulations, Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. McDonnell, F. Supp. 3d 641 (E.D.N.Y. 2018) 
(No. 18-CV-0361). 
 138. See supra Section II.B.2. 
 139. See infra Section II.C.3.b. 
 140. Bankruptcy: What Happens When Public Companies Go Bankrupt, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE 
COMMISSION (Jan. 19, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/investor-
publications/investorpubsbankrupthtm.html [https://perma.cc/K9SG-Y6JV]. 
 141. See generally discussion infra Section II.C. 
 142. Chapter 11—Bankruptcy Basics, U.S. CTS., https://www.uscourts.gov/services-
forms/bankruptcy/bankruptcy-basics/chapter-11-bankruptcy-basics [https://perma.cc/F4R8-V8C3] (last 
visited Oct. 20, 2019). 
 143. See Charles M. Tatelbaum, Shareholders Attain New Rights in Bankruptcy Proceedings, 
OBSERVER (Feb. 22, 2017, 11:00 AM), https://observer.com/2017/02/court-of-appeals-ninth-circuit-
shareholder-bankruptcy-rights/ [https://perma.cc/F3HR-SEZQ]. 
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arising from the purchase or sale of such a security, or for 
reimbursement or contribution allowed under section 
502 on account of such a claim, shall be subordinated to 
all claims or interests that are senior to or equal the claim or 
interest represented by such security, except that if 
such security is common stock, such claim has the same 
priority as common stock.144 
Investors in a business that file for bankruptcy can see their infusions 
dissipate or dry up before their claim is honored; conversely, 
creditors stand a better chance of recovery. 
Generally, the bankruptcy courts have ruled on the relation of 
§ 510(b) to securities in various contexts—and in the presence of 
various joined claims.145 The five cases summarized below provide 
examples of the contexts in which debtors have sought to subordinate 
claims in recent years. 
   (i)   In re Lehman Bros. Inc. 
In In re Lehman Bros. Inc.,146 the famed broker–dealer had been 
placed into liquidation under SIPA, which created the Securities 
Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC).147 The customer–claimant 
subsequently brought an action premised upon Lehman’s alleged 
failure to purchase Lehman Holding Company (LHI) bonds pursuant 
to a prime brokerage account agreement.148 The initial ruling 
                                                                                                             
 144. 11 U.S.C. § 510(b) (2018). 
 145. See infra Sections II.C.3.b(i–v). 
 146. In re Lehman Bros. Inc., 519 B.R. 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff’d, 808 F.3d 924 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 147. JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN ELLIOT GOODMAN, BARRON’S BUSINESS GUIDES: DICTIONARY OF 
FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 672 (9th ed. 2014). SIPC, a nonprofit corporation, aims to parallel 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation by “insur[ing] the securities and cash in the customer 
accounts of member brokerage firms against the failure of those firms.” Id. There are limits of, 
respectively, $100,000 for cash or cash equivalents, and $500,000 per customer account. Id. 
 148. See James Chen, Prime Brokerage, INVESTOPEDIA (Sept. 2, 2019), 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/p/primebrokerage.asp [http://perma.cc/LY25-EJB9]. Commencing 
in the 1980s, “prime brokerage” reflects packaged services for clients with sophisticated investment 
needs. Id. 
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sustained an objection by the trustee seeking to subordinate claims 
under § 510(b).149 
The claimant’s appeal centered on three arguments. First, a literal 
reading of § 510(b) should not apply in the absence of an actual 
purchase or sale.150 Second, it was asserted that the claim for 
damages should not be subordinated because it does not arise from 
the purchase or sale of the LHI bonds within the meaning of 
§ 510(b).151 Third, the claimant maintained that subordination of its 
claim did not advance the statute’s purpose.152 
Regarding statutory interpretation, the court reasoned that the 
claim “[did] not require ‘arising from’ to be read nearly as broadly as 
permitted under the [c]ase law.”153 Irrespective of the nature of the 
claim, the statute “require[d] subordination of claims by security 
holders that seek to recover, as [claimant] does, for the loss in value 
of a security issued by the debtor or an affiliate.”154 Concurrently, 
“[n]either Section 510(b) nor SIPA suggests an exception for 
transactions involving broker–dealer debtors either purchasing or 
selling affiliate bonds.”155 
Further, pursuant to case law, the court found it well settled that 
§ 510(b) applies even in the absence of an actual purchase or sale.156 
The bench ruled that under Med Diversified157 and other case law, it 
had been well settled that § 510(b) applies in the absence of an actual 
                                                                                                             
 149. In re Lehman Bros., 519 B.R. at 436. 
 150. Id. at 437. 
 151. Id. at 446. 
 152. Id. at 449. 
 153. Id. at 446. 
 154. Id. 
 155. In re Lehman Bros., 519 B.R. at 446. 
 156. Rombro v. Dufrayne (In re Med Diversified, Inc.), 461 F.3d 251, 252 (2d Cir. 2006). By 
comparison, the application of famed SEC Rule 10b-5—the measure which is used to punish insider 
trading and other securities fraud—often evaluates the actual purchase or sale of a security. See, e.g., 
Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 724 (1975) (dismissing a claim by parties 
dissuaded from purchasing the relevant securities). Such analysis is deemed mandated by the parting 
words of the provision: “in connection with the purchase or sale of a security.” Id. But see SEC v. 
Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 824 (2002) (finding a stockbroker liable for a Rule 10b-5 violation where 
monies were filched but no clearly related securities transactions noted). 
 157. In re Med Diversified, Inc., 461 F.3d at 252. 
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purchase or sale.158 “[G]iven ‘[t]he weight of precedent favoring 
subordination’ even where no purchase or sale has occurred, ‘and the 
absence of persuasive precedent upholding the contrary position, the 
ambiguity vel non of the statutory text’” was held to be 
inconsequential.159 Thus, the claim remained subordinated. 
Finally, in evaluating policy considerations, the Lehman Bros. 
court found that the “risk-allocation” rationale supported 
subordination of the claim.160 Though the claimant argued that this 
rationale did not apply because Lehman Brothers had agreed to pay a 
fixed sum of cash for the LHI bonds, the court noted the key 
distinction between case law and the present context: the fact that, in 
contrast to Med Diversified161and other cases where the claimant 
contracted to acquire more stock, the present claimant sought to 
dispose of the LHI Bonds, thereby “terminating its right to share in 
any appreciation in price.”162 In this vein, the court noted that the 
claimant still held the LHI bonds as of the petition date, and its claim 
was based in part on the diminished value of those bonds.163 
This policy analysis is not uncommon. One leading practitioner 
firm described the trend as such: 
Many courts have decided cases under section 510(b) by 
reviewing the traditional allocation of risk between a 
company’s shareholders and its creditors. Under this 
policy-based analysis, shareholders are deemed to expect 
more risk in exchange for the potential to participate in the 
profits of the company, whereas creditors can expect only 
repayment of their fixed debts. Accordingly shareholders, 
and not creditors, assume the risk of a wrongful or unlawful 
                                                                                                             
 158. See sources cited supra note 156 and accompanying text. 
 159. In re Lehman Bros., 519 B.R. at 446. 
 160. Id. at 447. 
 161. Id. at 447–48. 
 162. Id. at 447. 
 163. Id. at 447. 
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purchase or sale of securities . . . .164 
   (ii)   Marro v. General Maritime Corp. 
In 2014, the same year as Lehman Bros., the U.S. District Court 
for the Southern District of New York held that parties holding 
$50,000 worth of “Senior Notes” issued by a debtor seeking Chapter 
11 bankruptcy protection could not recover monies attributed to 
principal and lost opportunities.165 Specifically, in Marro v. General 
Maritime Corp., the court found § 510(b) inapplicable under the 
reorganization plan, which called for the debtors to distribute cash, 
equity, and warrants to the Senior Notes Indenture Trustee.166 Then, 
noteholders would receive these distributions as full satisfaction of 
their claims.167 Significantly, although the noteholder acknowledged 
receiving his distribution from the Trustee, he filed an additional 
proof of claim totaling $81,250–$50,000 for the principal amount of 
the notes and $31,250 for opportunity costs and other damages, 
which were attributed to fraudulent inducement, fraudulent retention, 
breach of contract for the bond indenture, and breach of fiduciary 
duty by the debtors.168 
The court held that although not every breach of contract claim is 
subject to mandatory subordination, the key is “whether the requisite 
nexus is present to tie the specific claim at issue to the claimant’s 
initial purchase of his securities.”169 Here, the noteholder himself 
described his claim as “a hybrid of fraudulent inducement, fraudulent 
retention[,] and breach of contract.”170 The court further held that on 
                                                                                                             
 164. Charles M. Oellermann & Mark G. Douglas, Mandatory Subordination Under Section 510(b) 
Extends to Claims Arising from Purchase or Sale of Affiliate’s Securities, JONES DAY PUBLICATIONS 
(Jones Day, New York, N.Y.), Mar./Apr. 2014, https://www.jonesday.com/Mandatory-Subordination-
Under-Section-510b-Extends-to-Claims-Arising-From-Purchase-or-Sale-of-Affiliates-Securities-03-31-
2014/ [https://perma.cc/DY63-P58S]. 
 165. Marro v. Gen. Mar. Corp. (In re Gen. Mar. Corp.), No. 13 Civ. 5019 (ER), 2014 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 137488, at *12–13 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2014). 
 166. Id. at *2. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at *2–3. 
 169. Id. at *10–11. 
 170. Id. at *11 (citation omitted). 
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its face, § 510(b) applied to any such claim because fraudulent 
inducement, by definition, describes misconduct occurring at the time 
of a security’s purchase.171 The court then found that the remaining 
theories of recovery—fraudulent retention, breach of fiduciary duty, 
and breach of contract—pertained to the debtor’s post-acquisition 
conduct. 172 However, under § 501(b) the outcome was the same.173 
   (iii)   Templeton v. O’Cheskey 
In 2015, the Fifth Circuit in Templeton v. O’Cheskey ruled that 
unsecured claims of both the liquidated and unliquidated variety 
should be subordinated.174 Templeton’s liquidated claim was 
submitted for reimbursement, although its unliquidated claim 
asserted fraud and breach of fiduciary duties in relation to those 
investments.175 The debtor’s Trustee commenced an adversary 
proceeding by filing a complaint that objected to Templeton’s 
claim.176 
Templeton invested in certain limited partnerships formed under 
the guaranty of the debtor, American Housing Foundation (AHF), 
who ultimately filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.177 Templeton 
asserted claims based on the guaranties against AHF, arguing that its 
claims should fall within “General Unsecured Claims”—for which 
the estimated recovery fell between 20% and 40% of the claim 
value.178 The Trustee argued instead that Templeton’s claims fell 
within “Allowed Subordinated Claims”—a class with a 0% estimated 
recovery.179 The decision was affirmed concerning the Trustee’s 
suggested subordination.180 The court expressly held that “all of 
                                                                                                             
 171. In re Gen. Mar Corp., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 137488, at *8. 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Templeton v. O’Cheskey (In re Am. Hous. Found.), 785 F.3d 143, 153 (5th Cir. 2015). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 150. 
 177. Id. at 146. 
 178. Id. at 146, 149. 
 179. Id. at 152. 
 180. In re Am. Hous. Found., 785 F.3d at 165. 
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Templeton’s claims [were] claims ‘for damages arising from the 
purchase or sale of’ a ‘security . . . of an affiliate of [AHF]’” and 
must, therefore, be subordinated.181 In turn, the court described its 
step-by-step analysis of this provision.182 
First, regarding the unliquidated claims—fraud and breach of 
fiduciary duties—Templeton sought damages based on the injuries 
that resulted from these torts.183 Moreover, Templeton’s liquidated 
claims, which sought reimbursement under AHF’s guaranties, also 
constituted claims for damages.184 Although Templeton was suing for 
the breach of the guaranties of limited partnership (LP) interests 
(rather than for repayment of his equity investments in the LPs), such 
proposed treatment was held to be exactly the “elevation of form 
over substance that § 510(b) seeks to avoid—by subordinating claims 
that functionally seek to ‘recover a portion of claimants’ equity 
investments.’”185 
By means of elaboration, the court found that Templeton’s claims 
arose from the purchase of securities.186 To arise from the purchase 
or sale of a security, the claim must have some causal relationship 
with the sale. 187 Templeton itself clarified that the tort claims 
stemmed directly from the LP investments.188 Furthermore, those LP 
interests were securities of an affiliate189 of AHF as directly 
referenced by the statute.190 The Bankruptcy Code defines “affiliate,” 
in relevant part, as a “person whose business is operated under a 
lease or operating agreement by a debtor, or person substantially all 
of whose property is operated under an operating agreement with the 
                                                                                                             
 181. Id. at 153. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 154. 
 185. Id. at 155. 
 186. In re Am. Hous. Found., 785 F.3d at 157. 
 187. Id. at 155 (citations omitted). 
 188. Id. at 155. 
 189. 11 U.S.C. § 101(2)(c) (2018). 
 190. Id. § 510(b). 
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debtor.”191 The Templeton court thus had little tolerance for creative, 
alternative pleading in light of the plain language of the statute. 
   (iv)   Murphy v. Madden 
In 2016, the Sixth Circuit in Murphy v. Madden held that a 
shareholder of Energy Conversion Devices (ECD) could not 
effectively convert a securities claim to a novel tort action premised 
upon a surprise bankruptcy filing.192 ECD and a related entity, United 
Solar Ovonic LLC, filed a Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition.193 Murphy 
was a shareholder of ECD, holding 116,950 shares of ECD stock.194 
The bankruptcy court authorized ECD’s liquidation sale through the 
auction of nearly all of its assets.195 Murphy filed a claim for breach 
of performance and violations of fiduciary responsibility to 
shareholders.196 Because ECD’s actions in filing the petition and 
subsequent liquidation sale substantially reduced the value of his 
stock, Murphy claimed that he was owed $136,890, representing the 
value of his shares of stock on the morning before the formal 
commencing of the bankruptcy.197 
The liquidation trustee concluded that Murphy merely had an 
equity interest in EDC and that under § 510(b), his breach of 
fiduciary duty claim still required subordination to the ECD’s 
creditors’ claims.198 Murphy countered that the section did not apply 
because his claim originated from his ownership of ECD stock rather 
than from his actual purchase of the stock.199 Murphy argued that 
judicial estoppel prohibited the application of § 510(b) to his claim 
because ECD’s Bankruptcy Plan did not contemplate the section’s 
                                                                                                             
 191. Id. § 101(2)(c). 
 192. Murphy v. Madden (In re Energy Conversion Devices, Inc.), No. 15-1734, 2016 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 4414, at *1–6, *9 (6th Cir. Feb. 19, 2016). 
 193. Id. at *1. 
 194. Id. at *2. 
 195. Id. 
 196. Id. 
 197. In re Energy Conversion Devices, Inc., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 4414, at *2. 
 198. Id. at *2–3. 
 199. Id. at *3–4 (emphasis added). 
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application to noteholders who, like Murphy, merely owned ECD 
securities. 200 
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the Trustee’s Order, concluding that 
Murphy’s claim required subordination under § 510(b).201 The court 
held that, for purposes of the section, there is no distinction between 
fraud committed when the securities were purchased and fraud 
committed after the purchase that adversely affects one’s ability to 
sell those securities.202 Thus, the claim still arises from the purchase 
or sale of such a security when an investor’s claim for damages is 
caused by fraud either at the time of the purchase or post-purchase.203 
The court further held that Murphy’s judicial estoppel argument was 
misplaced because unlike Murphy, who merely held an equity 
interest in ECD, the noteholders held debt interest in ECD.204 
Accordingly, unlike Murphy’s equity interests, the noteholders were 
unsecured creditors with claims against ECD not subject to 
subordination under § 510(b).205 
   (v)   Liquidating Trust Communication of the Del Biaggio  
Liquidating Trust v. Freeman 
Finally, the Ninth Circuit weighed in via Liquidating Trust 
Communication of the Del Biaggio Liquidating Trust v. Freeman.206 
In Liquidating Trust, “the entity charged with prosecuting claims 
[during the] Del Biaggio’s bankruptcy” received an objection from 
David Freeman, an investor in Predators Holdings, LLC.207 The case 
has somewhat of a story behind it. 
                                                                                                             
 200. Id. at *4. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at *4–5 (citations omitted). 
 203. In re Energy Conversion Devices, Inc., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 4414, at *4–5. 
 204. Id. at *5. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Liquidating Tr. Commc’n of the Del Biaggio Liquidating Tr. v. Freeman (In re Del Biaggio), 
834 F.3d 1003, 1006 (9th Cir. 2016). 
 207. Id. at 1006–07. 
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The Nashville Predators are a National Hockey League team based 
in Nashville, Tennessee that in 2007 was owned by Craig Leipold.208 
In 2007, after David Freeman learned that Leipold intended to sell 
the Predators to a third party who would move the team out of 
Tennessee, Freeman began organizing a group of Nashville investors 
to buy the team to avoid the potential move.209 Ultimately, Freeman 
and his group of investors reached an agreement to purchase the 
Predators from Leipold for $193 million.210 The sale of the Predators 
to Freeman and his group of investors, including William Del 
Biaggio III, closed on December 7, 2007.211 After the sale, Nashville 
Hockey Club Limited wholly owned and operated the Predators.212 In 
turn, Predators Holdings, LLC (Holdings) wholly owned the 
Nashville Hockey Club Limited.213 
After a few months, Freeman discovered that Del Biaggio never 
had the necessary funds to support his guarantees.214 Del Biaggio 
then filed for Chapter 11, giving rise the proceeding that ultimately 
went before the Ninth Circuit with Freeman filing a general 
unsecured claim against Del Biaggio’s bankruptcy estate seeking 
damages from Del Biaggio’s fraud in the Holdings transaction.215 In 
response, the Liquidating Trust Committee filed a counterclaim 
against Freeman seeking summary judgment on the issues of 
subordination and disallowance of Freeman’s claim based on 
§ 510(b).216 
Freeman lost, but on appeal he argued the bankruptcy court and 
district court erred in applying § 510(b) to his claim against Del 
Biaggio, contending his claim did not arise from the purchase or sale 
of Holdings.217 Freeman further contended there was no privity 
                                                                                                             
 208. Id. at 1006. 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. In re Del Biaggio, 834 F.3d at 1006. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. at 1006–07. 
 215. Id. at 1007. 
 216. Id. 
 217. Id. at 1008. 
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because he purchased the Holdings securities from Leipold—not Del 
Biaggio.218 Freeman also sought to avoid § 510(b)’s language by 
arguing that even if its text pointed towards subordination, its 
purposes did not.219 
The circuit court denied all of Freeman’s objections.220 The Ninth 
Circuit began by looking at the statute’s plain text, observing that 
§ 510(b)’s “arising from” language reached broadly to subordinate 
damage claims involving qualifying securities.221 Citing to a 2015 
case, the bench held that: 
The phrase “arising from” as employed in [the section] 
“connotes, in ordinary usage, something broader than 
causation” and is instead “ordinarily understood to mean 
‘originating from,’ ‘having its origin in,’ ‘growing out of,’ 
or ‘flowing from’ or in short, ‘incident to, or having 
connection with.’”222 
Additionally, the court found it irrelevant that Freeman purchased the 
securities from Leipold rather than from Del Biaggio.223 The court 
reasoned that the statute only said a damages claim must arise from 
the purchase of securities “of an affiliate of the debtor,” not from the 
debtor himself.224 Accordingly, the lack of privity was irrelevant. 
In general, the Freeman court reminded that there are “two main 
rationales for mandatory subordination: (1) the dissimilar risk and 
return expectations of shareholders and creditors; and (2) the reliance 
of creditors on the equity cushion provided by shareholder 
investment.”225 As he admitted, Freeman bargained for increased risk 
                                                                                                             
 218. In re Del Biaggio, 834 F.3d at 1010. 
 219. Id. 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. at 1009. 
 222. Id. at 1010 (citing Pensco Tr. Co. v. Tristar Esperanza Props., LLC (In re Tristar Esperanza 
Props., LLC), 782 F.3d 492, 497 (9th Cir. 2015)). 
 223. Id. 
 224. In re Del Biaggio, 834 F.3d at 1010. 
 225. Id. 
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in exchange for an expectation in the Holdings’s profits by investing 
in an affiliate of Del Biaggio.226 However, Del Biaggio’s creditors 
did not take this type of gamble 227 Thus, the court found that 
allowing Freeman to stand on par with Del Biaggio’s creditor would 
give Freeman the “best of both worlds—the right to share in profits if 
[Holdings] succeeded and the right to repayment as a creditor [of Del 
Biaggio] if it failed.”228 
Indeed, the “best of both worlds” rationale appears to permeate the 
case law of numerous circuits. To be sure, on various grounds in 
various settings, courts evaluating a security’s § 510(b) status have 
favored subordination.229 It is worth noting that all of the circuit court 
decisions noted above were unanimous.230 Interestingly, the emphasis 
on the actual purchase or sale of securities—a common question in 
securities cases231—is evidenced. 
The bootstrapping of fraud claims to contractual claims has been 
consistently frowned upon by bankruptcy courts.232 Further, a 
bankruptcy court may unquestionably recharacterize a claim as 
equity “within the Code’s confines.”233 Yet, the interface of securities 
and bankruptcy law can rationally be characterized as a reflection of 
the times facing investors. Indeed, the Kripke–Slain Hypothesis (the 
Hypothesis)—although amplifying creditor expectations to be paid 
before shareholders—nonetheless also posited that most claims arose 
from fraudulent conversion at or near the time of sale.234 
                                                                                                             
 226. Id. at 1011. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. at 1011–12. 
 230. In re Del Biaggio, 834 F.3d at 1011–12. 
 231. FIN. ACTION TASK FORCE, supra note 6. 
 232. See generally In re Lehman Bros., 503 B.R. 778 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014) (subordinating a claim 
against a stockbroker for a failed trade), aff’d on other grounds, In re Lehman Bros. Inc., 519 B.R. 434 
(S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff’d, 808 F.3d 924 (2d Cir. 2015). 
 233. FCC v. Tel. & Data Sys., Inc (In re Airadigm Commc’ns, Inc.), 392 B.R. 392, 400 (Bankr. W.D. 
Wis. 2008). 
 234. See generally John J. Slain & Homer Kripke, The Interface Between Securities Regulation and 
Bankruptcy—Allocating the Risk of Illegal Securities Issuance Between Securityholders and the Issuer’s 
Creditors, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 261 (1973). 
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Because the ICO investor–depositor can now trust the SEC to have 
prevented fraud ab initio (i.e., ICO warranting registration shall be so 
required), a model based upon shareholder rescission seems a bit out 
of date. Concomitantly, the recognition that fraud, if any, is more 
likely to occur after the ICO takes place provides a clear point of 
demarcation between speculation and expectation. 
c.   A Modern Trend? 
Securities law has long been thought to be policy influenced.235 
The question thus becomes, whether policy considerations will 
unsettle Bankruptcy Code favoritism of debtors urging subordination 
when frauds become more readily apparent and separated in time 
from the initial purchase of stock. It is axiomatic that something more 
than creditor negligence is required to warrant equitable 
subordination under § 510(c)236 while statutory subordination is 
undergoing a period of review. ICOs, with their billion-dollar 
paydays and often inscrutable technical characteristics, can be said to 
present a ripe opportunity for a re-evaluation of both § 510(b) and the 
Hypothesis. 
                                                                                                             
 235. See, e.g., Arthur Levitt, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, A Question of Integrity: 
Promoting Investor Confidence by Fighting Insider Trading (Feb. 27, 1998) (extolling the practicality of 
the Supreme Court’s O’Hagan decision, which utilized a new SEC theory to expand the insider trading 
ban to trading by corporate “outsiders”). 
 236. 11 U.S.C. § 510(c) reads in toto as follows: 
(c) Notwithstanding subsections (a) and (b) of this section, after notice and a hearing, 
the court may— 
(1) under principles of equitable subordination, subordinate for purposes of 
distribution all or part of an allowed claim to all or part of another 
allowed claim or all or part of an allowed interest to all or part of another allowed 
interest; or 
(2) order that any lien securing such a subordinated claim be transferred to the 
estate. 
11 U.S.C. § 510(c) (2018). The case requiring something exceeding creditor negligence is Crede v. Bank 
of N.Y. Mellon Corp., 809 F.3d 958 (7th Cir. 2016). 
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II.   Is a New Protocol Warranted by the Advent of Mass Investment 
in Digital Currencies? 
In their 1973 article, The Interface Between Securities Regulation 
and Bankruptcy—Allocating the Risk of Illegal Securities Issuance 
between Securityholders and the Issuer’s Creditors, experts Homer 
Kripke and John J. Slain examined the then-status-quo and concluded 
that investors were receiving unfair priority vis-à-vis creditors in 
bankruptcy proceedings administered under the federal Bankruptcy 
Code.237 Focusing on the traditional “absolute priority rule,” the 
study pointed out that the SEC support for the investor priority was 
unfounded and urged deference to the notion of general creditors 
coming first. 238 Messrs. Kripke and Slain were pointed in their 1973 
observation that the absolute priority rule was being averted.239 Does 
their rationale hold up in today’s complex markets? 
A.   The Mt. Gox Debacle 
Mt. Gox was a Bitcoin exchange launched in 2010 based in 
Japan.240 By 2014, Mt. Gox was the largest Bitcoin exchange in the 
world, with over 70% of Bitcoin transactions.241 But all was not well 
with Mt. Gox; starting in 2011, Mt. Gox had experienced a series of 
hacks, totaling about 630,000 Bitcoin by 2013.242 In February 2014, 
Mt. Gox halted all Bitcoin withdrawals.243 The former CEO of Mt. 
Gox (who also owned approximately 88% of the failed exchange) 
continues to face a class action in Illinois.244 That action was brought 
                                                                                                             
 237. Slain & Kripke, supra note 234, at 298–99. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Id. 
 240. Andrew Norry, The History of the Mt Gox Hack: Bitcoin’s Biggest Heist, BLOCKONOMI (June 7, 
2019), https://blockonomi.com/mt-gox-hack/ [https://perma.cc/V3C2-LD66]. 
 241. Id. 
 242. Liesl Eichholz, MtGox, BTC-e, and the Missing Coins: A Living Timeline of the Greatest Cyber 
Crime Ever, BRAVE NEW COIN (Aug. 16, 2017, 4:42 PM), https://bravenewcoin.com/insights/mtgox-
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 243. Id. 
 244. Brian Flood, Mt. Gox Chief Can’t Escape Suit over Crypto Exchange Collapse, BLOOMBERG L. 
(Mar. 13, 2019, 1:04 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/class-action/mt-gox-chief-cant-escape-suit-
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by owners of Bitcoin who were abruptly informed that all 
withdrawals were being halted for technical reasons, when in 
actuality, hackers had purloined hundreds of millions of dollars’ 
worth of assets.245 In February 2014, Mt. Gox filed for bankruptcy 
protection under Japanese law.246 The CEO was confined to the 
island nation while under investigation for theft, a process that did 
not resolve until March 2019.247 
In the five years since the Mt. Gox disaster, the following 
chronology has been revealed. The fledgling exchange, operating 
under Japanese law, successfully solicited over $1 million of 
Bitcoin.248 By 2013, allegedly, third-party banks were placing 
pressure on the unique exchange to settle accounts out of fear of its 
ties to money laundering.249 Consequentially, Mt. Gox users began to 
experience difficulties in withdrawing their funds from Mt. Gox 
accounts.250 Parties within and outside Mt. Gox were later alleged to 
have wrongfully continued to accept deposits from new Bitcoin 
purchasers, while behind the scenes operations were freezing up.251 
When the Mt. Gox owner eventually shuttered the exchange and filed 
for bankruptcy protection under Japanese law in February 2014, 
liabilities were represented as exceeding $65 million, while the 
forsaken Bitcoins were valued at over $400 million (allegedly due to 
an unpreventable hacking).252 
In June 2014, a Texas bankruptcy court recognized the primacy of 
the Japanese bankruptcy proceeding and stayed all other litigation.253 
                                                                                                             
over-crypto-exchange-collapse [https://perma.cc/J5N8-8ZWM]. 
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 246. Eichholz, supra note 242. 
 247. Flood, supra note 244. 
 248. Norry, supra note 240. 
 249. Fourth Amended Class Action Complaint at 7, Greene v. Mizuho Bank, Ltd., 206 F. Supp. 3d 
1362 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (No. 1:14-cv-01437). 
 250. Id. at 8. 
 251. Id. 
 252. Id. at 11. 
 253. Id. at 12. In March 2018, a company official stated that the company had sold off enough assets 
to satisfy customer claims. Report from Nobuaki Kobayashi, Bankr. Tr., to Tokyo Dist. Court, 
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Though the Mt. Gox example continues to be sorted out and, 
incontrovertibly, visited irreparable woe upon creditor and investor–
depositor alike, the case stands out foremost as a notorious initial 
chapter to the book of Bitcoin. The persisting domestic litigation 
concerns the actions of individuals and not any bankruptcy estate; 
truly, Mt. Gox is a curious tale of an exchange that either did or did 
not ever exist, thus simply exponentially increasing the losses due to 
a traditional shareholder rescission claim. Accordingly, to reevaluate 
the rights of the cryptocurrency shareholder more meaningfully, a 
court of repute was needed to upend traditional thought and refuse to 
subordinate the claim of the cryptoshareholder, who invested in a 
seemingly legitimate enterprise and was much later defrauded via 
conventional human theft. A California case with disturbing facts 
created such a chance in 2017.254 
B.   The Ninth Circuit Mini-Revolution in Khan 
During the first decade of this century, as markets swung 
volatilely, commentators followed in earnest the saga of 
subordination.255 In one noteworthy case, the U.S. District Court for 
the Southern District of Texas subordinated over $2.7 million in debt 
in a Chapter 11 battle between limited partners of a sea diving 
company.256 Indeed, multiple circuits were said to subscribe to the 
trend of finding congressional intent for a broad concept of 
subordination of investments.257 
However, a minor revolution occurred in 2017 within the Ninth 
Circuit. In the Khan case, the appellate court, noting the dual 
obstacles awaiting shareholders alleging fraud, severed the timeline 
                                                                                                             
the United States continues. See, e.g., Pearce v. Karpeles, No. 18-306, 2019 WL 3409495 (E.D. Pa. July 
26, 2019). 
 254. See Khan v. Barton (In re Khan), 846 F.3d 1058, 1066 (9th Cir. 2017). 
 255. See Laurence May, Claimants Fight Subordination, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 29, 2009, at 1. 
 256. SeaQuest Diving, LP v. S & J Diving, Inc. (In re SeaQuest Diving, LP), 579 F.3d 411, 416 (5th 
Cir. 2009). 
 257. May, supra note 255. 
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between the purchase of securities and unexpected fraud occurring 
later on.258 
1.   The Khan Decision 
The Khan case, a play told in three parts, was described by the 
highest court to hear the matter as “a saga of picaresque behavior.”259 
In In re Khan, a Chapter 13 bankruptcy action was brought in a Ninth 
Circuit Bankruptcy court.260 The bankruptcy court first converted a 
Chapter 13 action to a Chapter 7 proceeding and then decided against 
subordinating a creditor’s claims.261 
The facts are as follows: in 2013, creditor Kenneth Barton 
succeeded in obtaining a state court judgment against a corporate 
debtor for conversion, fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty.262 Barton 
alleged that after he suffered a stroke in 2009 his cofounders 
converted his approximately 6,000,000 shares of common stock of 
the debtor (issued in 2001).263 The California Superior Court agreed 
that the Debtors had “fraudulently converted Barton’s stock” by 
means of “forged corporate resolutions.”264 Further, these parties had 
“misplaced or destroyed” the records of shareholder ownership.265 
The Superior Court, after additional hearings, awarded damages to 
Barton of approximately $3.8 million.266 
The Debtors quickly filed for Chapter 13 bankruptcy; that petition 
was converted to a Chapter 7 based upon a court finding of bad 
faith.267 The bankruptcy court found that Barton’s claim was not 
subject to subordination because it stemmed from the Superior Court 
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judgment.268 The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed the 
bankruptcy court ruling on simpler grounds: that § 510(b) cannot 
apply to debtors who are individuals.269 Finally, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with the refusal of the 
lower courts to subordinate, noting that the judgment creating 
Barton’s claim was based upon actions by the Debtors “many years 
later” in relation to the initial issuance of the company stock.270 
2.   Khan and the SEC Actions Combined 
Such a severed timeline spells relief for ICO investors who often 
watch purchases of cryptocurrency later disappear due to hacking or 
outright waste. And SEC action serves to bolster the shareholder 
claim by separating the registration (i.e., § 5) violation from the fraud 
(i.e., Rule 10b-5) violation, an approach evident in the Munchee 
Order, Mayweather Order, and other disciplinary cases to date.271 
In sum, the spate of SEC actions accord ICO purchasers investor 
status, and the distinctions drawn between initial purchase and 
subsequent fraud echo the Ninth Circuit’s attack on subordination. 
According the investor–creditor status could greatly increase the 
likelihood of salvaging a claim, thus making § 510(b)’s treatment of 
shareholders a new and pivotal issue in many hotly contested 
bankruptcy matters.272 That subordination issue was last addressed 
nearly fifty years ago, and given the vast amounts of online 
investments likely to be deemed securities, it is in dire need of 
updating. 
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 269. Id. 
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Blue Earth, No. 17-cv-03905, 2018 WL 4378713, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2018) (noting that “Section 
501(b)’s ‘arising from’ language ‘reaches broadly to subordinate damage claims involving qualifying 
securities’ and ‘requires that claims be subordinated “where there exists some nexus or causal 
relationship between the claim and the purchase of the securities”‘”) (citation omitted). 
 271. See supra Section II.B.2. 
 272. May, supra note 255, at 1–2. 
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III.   Elevated Status for Severable Crypto Investments 
A.   The Kripke–Slain Hypothetical 
In their seminal article, the esteemed experts Kripke and Slain273 
worked from the following example: 
Assume that XYZ, Inc., having just been organized to 
engage in the widget business, requires an additional 
$300,000 of capital to start up. XYZ’s management, either 
directly or through investment bankers, searches for a 
group of substantial investors prepared to provide the 
$300,000 and accept equity risks. They locate one such 
investor, H, who has a personal investment portfolio of 
several million dollars. Prior to his retirement, H was 
employed as a portfolio manager for a financial business 
and is concededly a “sophisticated investor.” H meets the 
principals in XYZ . . . and purchases 30,000 shares of 
XYZ’s common stock for $180,000. . . . Another 20,000 
shares are sold for $120,000 to others less sophisticated, 
who are impressed by the information that the sophisticated 
Mr. H is participating. 
 
XYZ begins operations and for six months after H’s stock 
purchase conducts an active business. The corporation 
quickly incurs $1,000,000 in liabilities to unsecured 
lenders . . . . [One month later the corporation files for 
bankruptcy.] In this proceeding, H asserts a claim for 
rescission of his $180,000 stock purchase, alleging that the 
issuer violated Section 5 of the Securities Act of 
1933 . . . . XYZ’s trustee in bankruptcy attempts to show 
that the issue was exempted as a nonpublic offering under 
Section 4(2) of the Act, but fails when he is unable to 
                                                                                                             
 273. The authors each were enrolled in graduate law courses taught by Professor Slain (1927–2014), a 
recognized expert in securities regulation. 
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demonstrate that all the persons to whom the $300,000 in 
stock had been offered were “sophisticated” . . . . [I]t is 
probable that H has a claim . . . to share pari passu with the 
claims of general creditors.274 
B.   A More Modern Hypothetical 
The hypothetical offered by Messrs. Kripke and Slain spoke 
strongly in support of the fairness of their interpretation. The 
following updated hypothetical highlights the problem caused for 
purchases of ICOs—either direct or indirect—by investors when the 
intermediary goes bankrupt: 
Assume that online issuer XYZ, Inc., having just created a 
charter for a unique digital coin environment, requires an 
additional $5 million of capital to start up. XYZ’s 
management, either directly or through internet financiers, 
offers coins to provide $5 million. They locate a well-
heeled investor, H, who has a personal investment portfolio 
numbering in the tens of millions of dollars. 
 
Before his retirement, H was employed as a portfolio 
manager for a financial business and is concededly a 
“sophisticated investor.” He trades information online with 
the principals in XYZ and purchases 3,000 coins for $2.8 
million. Another 2,000 coins are sold for $1.2 million to 
others less sophisticated, (I & J), who are impressed by the 
information that the sophisticated Mr. H is participating. 
 
XYZ begins operations and for six months after H’s coin 
purchase conducts an active business. The corporation 
quickly incurs $1,000,000 in liabilities to unsecured 
lenders. Then, six months later, the company informs the 
                                                                                                             
 274. Slain & Kripke, supra note 234, at 263–65 (citations omitted). 
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public that all assets are gone due to hacking. The 
principals apologize for less than ideal safety procedures. 
One month later, XYZ corporation files for bankruptcy. 
 
In this proceeding, H asserts a claim for rescission of his 
$2.8 million stock purchase, alleging that the issuer 
violated § 5 of the Securities Act of 1933 (to bring the 
action within the scope of the securities laws). That claim is 
subordinated. 
 
Simultaneously, I and J assert claims for damages due to 
negligence. I and J would seem to have a severable claim, 
because (per Khan) the claims were due to the unforeseen 
theft by other individuals. 
 
XYZ’s trustee in bankruptcy attempts to show that the issue 
was exempted as a nonpublic offering under § 4(2) of the 
Act, but fails when he is unable to demonstrate that all the 
persons to whom the $5 million in coins had been offered 
were sophisticated. It is probable that H has a claim to 
share pari passu with the claims of general creditors. 
 
Yet, I and J would seem to make plausible arguments that 
their claims are on par with creditors, due to the rational 
reading of the timeline of the case. 
As Khan educates, “[T]here is a limit to the reach of § 510(b), which 
stops short of encompassing every transaction that touches on or 
involves stock in a corporation.”275 
                                                                                                             
 275. Khan v. Barton (In re Khan), 846 F.3d 1058, 1064 (9th Cir. 2017). 
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CONCLUSION: TIME FOR A NEW NORMAL? 
A.   A Pointed Summary 
The current application of the absolute priority rule to investor 
claims is premised on a study that is over fifty years old.276 Although 
the Kripke–Slain Hypothesis is laudable, it is in need of updating for 
unconventional online investments. Simply put, those two 
outstanding scholars produced an interpretation of § 510(b) at a time 
when the thorniest investor–issuer disputes centered on varying share 
classes and interlocking partnership agreements. Today’s issues 
question: (1) the very existence of a security; (2) the point at which 
issuer wrongdoing (if any) transpired; (3) the ability of the 
bankruptcy estate to locate the funds being fought over; (4) whether 
there is a ceiling on financial assets contributed and gathered online; 
and (5) a novel interdependency of regulatory action, criminal 
charges, and class action litigation in the absence of timely statutory 
changes.277 
Further, recent efforts at updating the Code have centered on its 
possible abuse by debtors.278 Although such avoidance of judicial and 
economical waste is salutary, that focus forestalls or precludes 
amendment to § 510(b)—particularly at a time when neither 
Congress nor regulators have defined cryptocurrencies and their 
latest incarnation, the ICO. 
Accordingly, to promulgate a working arrangement for victims of 
insolvent crypto-issuers, the present authors have offered the 
following syllogism: 
1. As evidenced by over seventy years of successful 
                                                                                                             
 276. Slain & Kripke, supra note 234, at 298–99. 
 277. See In re Khan, 846 F.3d at 1064; Zack Christensen, The FAIR Funds for Investors Provision of 
Sarbanes-Oxley: Is It Unfair to the Creditors of a Bankrupt Debtor?, 71 U. ILL. L. REV 339, 339 (2005); 
Colesanti, supra note 27, at 30; Hester Peirce, Comm’r, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Regulation: A View 
from Inside the Machine at University of Missouri School of Law (Feb. 6, 2019). 
 278. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 
Stat 23, 59, 75. 
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application, the Howey test broadly expands the 
securities laws to reach a great many (often unexpected) 
financial arrangements. 
2. As evidenced by noteworthy actions by the chief 
securities markets regulator, ICOs, since late 2017, are 
often presumed securities. 
3. As evidenced by the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, securities 
holders are subordinated to both secured and unsecured 
creditors. 
4. As evidenced by several decisions since 2017, a 
severable claim may be brought by the securities holder. 
5. Further, the Ninth Circuit has held that where the 
conversion is severable from the investment, an investor 
claim can overcome subordination. 
6. ICOs—when they have been disciplined by the SEC—
have been found to have commenced lawfully and later 
defrauded investor–depositors. 
7. Thus, a valid argument can be made for allowing the 
ICO purchaser to elevate his severable claim to pari 
passu status with creditors. 
Such a progression is more than just plausible; sharing the wealth 
appears the most equitable distribution of remaining estate proceeds 
given the uncertainties of ICOs that continue to puzzle market 
regulators.279 The biggest obstacle to a reorientation of the Kripke–
Slain Hypothesis is the Hypothesis itself.  
B.   Final Thoughts 
As a reminder, both the number of investor–depositors and the 
volume of their ICO contributions are staggering figures.280 
                                                                                                             
 279. Compare Clayton Statement, supra note 100 with Peirce, supra note 277 (opining that Howey is 
not a good fit for many ICO deals). 
 280. See supra Section II.B.2. 
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Consequentially, regulators are racing to inform the public of the 
attendant risk of loss.281 
To be sure, the elevation of claim advocated herein would create 
some new obstacles. For example, creditors would find themselves 
sharing a depleted trust with investor–purchasers who might already 
be better off financially. However, in the complicated world of 
recovery for securities fraud, creditors already face such competition. 
As far back as 2005, it was noted that SEC “FAIR Funds,” a creation 
of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002,282 prioritize recovered funds for 
defrauded investors.283 
 
                                                                                                             
 281. See, e.g., Initial Coin Offerings, FINRA, https://www.finra.org/investors/learn-to-invest/types-
investments/initial-coin-offerings-and-cryptocurrencies/initial-coin-offerings [https://perma.cc/Y5NV-
4S45] (last visited Oct. 20, 2019). 
 282. Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). 
 283. See Christensen, supra note 277. As Mr. Christensen argued: 
[T]he SEC and common stockholders may work an end-run around section 510(b) of 
the Bankruptcy Code and elevate the stockholders’ claims by resorting to the Fair 
Funds for Investors provision. Further, as corporate malfeasance increases public 
outrage, the SEC will face increasing pressure to divert funds to defrauded investors, 
leaving creditors to collect from a depleted bankruptcy estate. 
Id. 
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